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Rethinking State and Local Reliance on the Retail
Sales Tax:
Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?
Charles E. McLure, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) has appeared with the sud-
denness of a comet. Having first been detected as a tiny speck
emerging from the constellation Geek less than five years ago, e-
commerce is now upon us. E-commerce raises questions about many
key fiscal institutions we take for granted, among them the use of the
retail sales tax (RST) to finance state and local governments.1 In part,
questions about the RST arise because the tax, as it currently func-
tions, is an anachronism that reflects its origins in the Industrial Age
nearly 70 years ago; since the RST was created without a firm con-
ceptual basis and “just growed,” it is not surprising that it is defec-
tive—or that e-commerce magnifies its defects.2 But the problem
may be deeper than this; even if reformed, the RST may simply not
be suitable to serve as the most important source of tax revenue of
state and local governments in the twenty-first century.
This paper examines these issues. First, after briefly discussing tax
policy objectives, it describes the defects of the typical RST, noting
how e-commerce aggravates these defects. Then it examines ways
that have been proposed to fix the RST system to accommodate e-
commerce. Finally, it asks whether it would not be better to revamp
the finance of state and local government, by substituting either a
value added tax (VAT) or increased reliance on the income tax for
* Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution.
1. Initially, while describing and discussing principles and problems of taxation, I refer
only to “sales tax,” rather than to “sales and use tax.” Where necessary I distinguish between
sales taxes and use taxes. The meaning should be clear from context. I employ the terms “re-
mote commerce” and “electronic commerce” to refer to commerce that crosses state or na-
tional boundaries.
2. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Electronic Commerce and the Tax Assignment Problem:
Preserving State Sovereignty in a Digital World, 14 ST. TAX NOTES 1169 (1998).
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the state and especially the local RST. Appendix A discusses falla-
cious arguments for exempting electronic commerce from sales and
use taxation. Appendix B reproduces an “Appeal for Fair and Equal
Taxation of Electronic Commerce” that has been signed by more
than 170 academic tax specialists. Appendix C is the proposal for
massive simplification of sales and use taxes I submitted to the Advi-
sory Commission on Electronic Commerce in December 1999. Ap-
pendix D indicates how a state VAT could be implemented.
II. OBJECTIVES OF TAX POLICY
In order to identify defects in tax policy, it is necessary to have
criteria against which to judge policies. The following is a list of
commonly accepted objectives of tax policy. Because the conven-
tional criteria of economic neutrality, equity, simplicity, and trans-
parency are well-known and the purpose of writing this article is not
to produce a treatise on tax policy, the discussion of those criteria is
brief. I describe principles of tax assignment in greater detail, since
they are not as well-known, but lie at the heart of the analysis that
follows.
A. Conventional Tax Policy Criteria
Most textbooks describe the following criteria of good tax policy.
1. Economic neutrality
The case for economic neutrality is based on the belief that mar-
kets do fairly well in determining, inter alia, what to consume, what
to produce, how to organize and finance production and distribu-
tion, where to locate economic activity, and whether to save and in-
vest or consume.3 A tax is neutral if it does not interfere with these
decisions. For example, a sales tax that applies equally to all con-
sumption occurring in a given jurisdiction is relatively neutral (dis-
torting only the choice of where to live, a decision not likely to be
much affected by the level of sales taxation), whereas a tax on all
production occurring in the same jurisdiction is less likely to be neu-
3. For reasons explained by the theory of optimal taxation, a neutral tax may not be
optimal. A discussion of the theory of optimal taxation and its shortcomings as a guide to pol-
icy would take us far afield, but see Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems,
4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157 (1990).
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tral, as it distorts the choice of where to locate production. A tax that
applies selectively to only some consumption or some production
distorts choices of what to consume or what to produce. Finally, a
tax on capital goods discourages investment.
2. Equity
Equity is essentially a matter of what society believes to be fair.
Equity can be placed in two categories. Horizontal equity involves
collecting similar amounts of tax from those in similar circumstances.
Vertical equity involves collecting differing amounts of tax from
those whose circumstances, commonly measured by their income,
differ; a tax satisfies this criterion if tax liabilities differ systematically
in ways that society believes are appropriate. It is ordinarily agreed
that taxes should not be regressive—that they should not take a
larger share of income from those with lower incomes.4
3. Simplicity
Costs of compliance and administration should be reasonable,
and certainly no greater than required to implement a given policy.
If costs of implementing a particular policy are unreasonable, then
the policy should be rethought.
4. Transparency
Taxation should not be imposed in ways that obscure its burden.
B. Principles of Tax Assignment
The “tax assignment problem” can be stated as “who (which
level of government) should tax what, and how?”5
4. This characterization is almost certainly true of aggregate tax burdens. It is less
compelling for specific taxes, especially those levied to pay for benefits provided to identifiable
beneficiaries.
5. For a more complete discussion, and references provided therein, of tax assignment,
see Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Tax Assignment Problem: Conceptual and Administrative
Considerations in Achieving Subnational Fiscal Autonomy (March 16-27, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript presented at the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Financial Manage-
ment Course, OECD Multilateral Tax Centre, Vienna, Austria) (on file with the author).
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1. Objectives of tax assignment
In solving the tax assignment problem, it is necessary to consider
several objectives that are not adequately captured in the conven-
tional criteria listed above. Several are mentioned again here, despite
being listed above, to emphasize their importance for tax assign-
ment. These are clear enough to be stated with little elaboration.
a. Revenue adequacy. Revenues of subnational governments
should be adequate to finance the appropriate functions of these
governments.6
b. Fiscal autonomy. Subnational governments should be able to
control the level of revenues they receive, so they can control their
level of expenditures.
c. Relation of taxes and benefits. To the extent possible, those
who consume services provided by subnational governments should
pay for them.
d. Tax competition. Competition in the supply of public services
and in taxation should be encouraged to discipline politicians and
bureaucrats to be efficient and to provide the services citizens want.
e. Locational neutrality. Taxes levied by subnational govern-
ments should not distort the location of economic activity.
f. Avoidance of tax exporting. Burdens of taxation levied by sub-
national governments should not be borne by non-residents. 7
g. Administrative feasibility. It should be possible to implement
the taxes assigned to subnational governments without undue costs
of compliance and administration.
2. Issues of tax assignment
The tax assignment problem can be divided into four sub-
questions: (a) Which taxes should subnational governments be al-
lowed to levy? (b) Which level of government should define the tax
base(s)? (c) Which level of government should set the tax rate(s)? (d)
Which level of government should administer the tax(es)?
I have argued elsewhere that the choice of tax rates is, by far, the
most important decision for the fiscal sovereignty of subnational
6. Determining “the appropriate functions of these governments” is the expenditure
assignment problem.
7. However, not all tax exporting is bad: taxes intended to serve as user charges should
be exported if non-residents consume public services. In what follows, tax exporting refers only
to situations that do not fall within the scope of this qualification.
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governments because that choice determines the level of public serv-
ices that can be provided. Moreover, tax competition between juris-
dictions in the setting of rates helps citizens control the monopolistic
tendencies of bureaucrats and politicians.8 By comparison, subna-
tional choice of tax bases and administration can create unacceptable
complexity and onerous costs of compliance and administration.
Subnational administration may be important if subnational govern-
ments do not trust the national government to exercise diligence in
administration of subnational taxes or to turn over revenues from
subnational taxes.
3. Methods of revenue assignment
Depending on how the previous questions are answered, one can
distinguish several methods of revenue assignment.9
a. Independent legislation and administration. First, individual
subnational governments may choose which taxes to levy, define tax
bases, set tax rates, and administer taxes, subject only to broad con-
stitutional limitations, as in the United States. That is, there may be
independent legislation and administration. This method provides
the greatest fiscal autonomy for subnational governments, but also
entails the greatest complexity and the greatest latitude for gaps and
overlaps in the tax base, with consequent distortions and inequities.
The current debate, triggered by the emergence of electronic com-
merce, suggests that, at least in its pure form, this approach is no
longer satisfactory in the case of the state sales tax. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota10 that the un-
coordinated actions of individual states have created a system that is
so complex that requiring remote vendors to collect use tax would
place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
b. Tax sharing. Second, national governments may share reve-
nues from particular taxes with subnational governments. Tax shar-
ing minimizes complexity and inconsistency of subnational tax bases,
but at the cost of complete loss of subnational fiscal sovereignty over
tax rates, as well as the tax base. In the American context, where
8. See McLure, supra note 5. (Competition should not extend to the choice of base
because of the complexity implied.)
9. I use the term “revenue assignment” because one of the methods (tax sharing) does
not involve tax assignment. It is more like revenue sharing or grants.
10. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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state sovereignty is highly prized, tax sharing is not appropriate, and
is not likely to be politically acceptable.
c. Surcharges. Third, subnational governments can impose taxes
on a base defined by a higher level of government. There are several
administrative variants of this approach. First, subnational govern-
ments can impose surcharges that are administered by the higher
level government; surcharges are widely used in Canada, for the in-
come tax, and at the local level in the United States, for both sales
and income taxes. Surcharges provide a combination of subnational
fiscal autonomy, simplicity, and consistency. They may be optimal in
many circumstances, such as in developing countries and countries in
transition from socialism. State sales tax surcharges are also not a re-
alistic alternative in the United States. After all, there is no federal
sales tax on which to place state surcharges, and state and local gov-
ernments would strenuously oppose federal entry into the sales tax
area.11
d. Subnational administration of taxes levied on a commonly de-
fined base. Fourth, subnational governments can administer taxes
levied on a commonly defined base; the base might be defined by the
national government or by the states acting in concert. This is essen-
tially the approach that underlies the value added tax (VAT) in the
European Union.12 If administration is uniform and consistent, this
approach may also provide an attractive combination of fiscal auton-
omy, simplicity, and consistency. It is especially worthy of considera-
tion in the United States, for reasons to be clarified below.
III. DEFECTS OF THE STATE RETAIL SALES TAXES
The retail sales taxes imposed by the states suffer from several
defects. Some problems are inherent; others, while not inherent, are
arguably more important. In order to understand these defects, it
will be useful to describe, in turn, an “ideal” RST, problems in im-
plementing the ideal, and the typical RST actually imposed in the
United States.
11. At one time, federal legislation provided for federal collection of income taxes for
any state that would conform its law to federal law. It was eventually repealed for lack of state
interest.
12. See Appendix D.
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A. The Benchmark: An Ideal RST
An ideal RST would be used to implement a destination-based
tax on consumption. This simple statement requires justification, and
it implies several corollaries.
1. The case for taxing only consumption
The ideal RST would apply only to purchases by households for
purposes of consumption.13 It would exempt all purchases by busi-
nesses, capital goods, goods for resale, fuels and utilities, office sup-
plies, or whatever. There are several reasons for this limitation. Tax-
ing goods bought for resale creates pyramiding (repeated taxation of
the same product) and creates incentives for vertical integration, as
well as inequities (discrimination against those who buy products
that are subject to multiple taxation). Taxing other sales to business
has similar effects, although perhaps not as obviously, and is also
likely to distort decisions on how to produce and distribute prod-
ucts. Taxes on business inputs also cause the perceived cost of gov-
ernment to be understated, because they are hidden and allow tax
rates to be artificially low; taxation limited to consumption would
make the cost of government more transparent. In addition to shar-
ing these faults, taxation of capital goods purchased by business dis-
courages investment. Finally, taxation of sales to business interferes
with the realization of destination-based taxation.
2. The case for taxing all consumption
If a sales tax is to be economically neutral, horizontally equitable,
and relatively simple, it should apply equally to all consumption
spending. Thus there should be no distinction between tangible
products, intangible products, and services and no distinctions based
on methods of ordering or delivering products. Where alternative
ways of achieving vertical equity are not readily available, as in devel-
oping countries, it may be thought appropriate to exempt products
that figure especially prominently in the market basket of low-
13. Several qualifications are in order. First, it may reasonably be decided that selected
business purchases (e.g., general purpose automobiles) should be taxed to prevent their tax-
free diversion to household use. Second, I generally focus on the distinction between sales to
households and sales to business, ignoring for the most part other sales, such as those to non-
profit organizations, governments, and quasi-governmental organizations.
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
84
income households, such as cereal grains. In developed countries,
fiscal devices such as progressive income taxation and family allow-
ances (the earned income tax credit in the American context) makes
this type of differential treatment unnecessary.
3. The case for destination-based taxation
A tax on transactions—e.g. the RST—can be levied consistently
at the origin or the destination of transactions that cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries.14 An origin-based tax applies to exports from the
taxing jurisdiction, as well as to domestic production; it does not ap-
ply to imports, but value added after the import stage is subject to
tax. In other words, an origin-based tax is a tax on production occur-
ring in the taxing jurisdiction. It is imposed at the rate chosen by the
jurisdiction of origin, which gets the revenue from the tax.
A destination-based tax is levied on the full retail value of im-
ports, exports are exempt, and any tax collected before the export
stage is refunded.15 A destination-based tax is levied on consumption
occurring in the taxing jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of destination
chooses the tax rate and receives the revenue.
A destination-based tax has several advantages. First, being a tax
on consumption, a destination-based tax is not likely to distort the
location of economic activity, except where cross-border shopping
(buying products in one jurisdiction for consumption in another) in
lower-tax jurisdictions and untaxed purchases from remote vendors
are economic alternatives. Second, such a tax probably serves rela-
tively well—and better than an origin-based tax—as a surrogate for
user charges for the consumption of public services.16 By compari-
son, while simpler to implement, an origin-based tax would distort
the location of economic activity and induce a “race to the bottom,”
as states compete to attract footloose industry by lowering taxes.
14. There are, of course, an infinite number of ways to levy taxes that follow no consis-
tent principle. However, the only such method discussed in this article is the extant RST.
15. Those familiar with the mechanics and terminology of the VAT will recognize that it
would be more accurate to say that exports are zero-rated, exporters are allowed credits for
VAT paid on purchases, and that tax collected before the export stage is refunded to the extent
it exceeds VAT due on non-export sales.
16. An origin-based tax is also more likely to be exported to non-residents than is a des-
tination-based tax. I do not emphasize this because tax exporting to non-resident consumers is
likely to be important only when the taxing state dominates the market for taxed products—a
relatively rare phenomenon, especially when a general sales tax is at issue. Exporting of an ori-
gin-based tax to out-of-state owners of productive assets is more likely.
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4. The need for uniformity
The three characteristics of an ideal RST discussed above should
guide the policy of any jurisdiction acting alone. More is required of
a sales tax levied in a multijurisdictional setting. Except for rates,
sales taxes should be essentially uniform across jurisdictions, both to
avoid undesirable economic effects and—of special significance in the
present context—to minimize costs of compliance and administra-
tion. Differences in rates must be allowed so that jurisdictions can
exercise this most important element of fiscal sovereignty.
a. Identical tax base. The tax base should be identical (or very
similar) in all jurisdictions. Otherwise, merchants operating in more
than one jurisdiction, including remote vendors, must know the tax
base in every jurisdiction where they make sales.17 The base would be
identical under the ideal sales tax described above. It would consist
of all sales to households and include no sales to business. If there
were exceptions to these rules (e.g., an exemption for prescription
medicine), all jurisdictions should adopt the same exceptions. Statu-
tory language and regulations describing the tax base and adminis-
trative procedures would need to be identical.
b. Identifying legitimate business deductions. One of the most
important features the ideal system must contain is a uniform means
of determining whether a given transaction is a taxable sale to a
household or an exempt sale to a business. There seems to be a rela-
tively simple solution to this problem. First, eligibility to make pur-
chases that are exempt from sales tax should be limited to purchasers
with federal employer identification numbers.18 The purchaser would
be required to provide this number when making tax-exempt pur-
chases. Second, such potentially exempt purchasers should be al-
lowed to make tax-exempt purchases only to the extent they are al-
lowed a deduction for the expenditure in question for federal income
tax purposes.19
There should be a uniform exemption certificate—which the
17. When I refer to “every jurisdiction where they make sales,” I ascribe the common-
sense meaning to these words to refer to the state where customers are located and to which
products are sent—not legal meanings such as the state where title passes.
18. A similar rule might allow only non-profit organizations that are registered with the
IRS to make tax-exempt purchases.
19. Eligibility for sales tax exemption should be interpreted broadly to include, for ex-
ample, eligibility for depreciation allowances.
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purchaser should be able to transmit electronically—that is recog-
nized by all states. The exemption certificate could be relatively sim-
ple; it need contain only two pieces of information: the purchaser’s
federal employer identification number and certification that the
purchase is deductible for federal income tax purposes. The existence
of information on the nature of products bought under each em-
ployer identification number would allow audit of the validity of
purchases ostensibly made for business purposes.20 This system
would work only if (essentially) all sales to business are exempt, as
they would be under the conceptual ideal; otherwise, cross-checking
between income tax and sales tax records would be too complicated.
c. Identical administrative requirements and procedures. Admin-
istrative requirements and procedures (registration, filing, payment
of tax, audit, appeals, etc.) should be identical (or virtually identical)
across states. There is no reason for vendors that do business in more
than one jurisdiction to need to comply with a different set of re-
quirements and procedures in each state. Particularly important, joint
audits should be performed on behalf of all states desiring audits.
d. Centralized compliance. To facilitate compliance, certain as-
pects of compliance and administration should be centralized, in a
base state, a multistate organization, or a “trusted third party”
(TTP). That is, forms and payments might be filed with the tax-
payer’s state of commercial domicile or a multistate agency, which
would distribute the relevant information and money to the individ-
ual states.21 Alternatively, a TTP would assume responsibility for
most of the burden of compliance. This is explained and discussed
further below.
e. De minimis rules. Small businesses incur costs of compliance
that are disproportionate to the amount of sales they make.22 Some
states provide “vendors’ discounts” intended to compensate for
these costs, but the discounts are generally inadequate to fully offset
costs. It may thus be appropriate to establish a de minimis amount of
20. Note that this compilation of information would pertain only to purchases for which
a business exemption is claimed.
21. I intentionally use the term “taxpayer” inaccurately in the case of the use tax to refer
to the vendor who collects the tax, rather than to the purchaser, who has the legal liability to
pay the tax and for whom the vendor collects the tax.
22. For a discussion of compliance and vendor’s discounts, see Robert J. Cline & Tho-
mas S. Neubig, Masters of Complexity and Bearers of Great Burden: The Sales Tax System and
Compliance Costs for Multistate Retailers, 18 ST. TAX NOTES 297 (2000). Note that compli-
ance costs are especially high because of the existence of local sales and use taxes.
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sales, below which there is no liability to collect sales or use tax. Dif-
ferent de minimis rules might be appropriate for intrastate and inter-
state sales. A de minimis rule is probably appropriate even under an
ideal system of the type described above and, in fact, would be pro-
vided, de facto, by an adequate vendors’ discount.
f. The question of local sales and use taxes. One of the trickiest is-
sues is whether an ideal RST could incorporate local sales and use
taxes. I tend to doubt it. If, however, there are to be local rates, cer-
tain things are implied.
g. Coincidence of ZIP codes and jurisdictional boundaries. Com-
pliance with (and administration of) local use taxes would be greatly
facilitated if the boundaries of taxing jurisdictions corresponded with
postal ZIP codes. This would enable remote vendors to easily ascer-
tain the local tax rate that should be applied to a particular sale and
the local jurisdictions that should receive use-tax revenues. At this
late date, this may be a counsel of perfection. It is possible that tax
compliance software can handle the problem by mapping nine digit
ZIP codes into jurisdictional boundaries.23
h. Zero-cost compliance. Governor Michael Leavitt of Utah, on
behalf of the National Governors’ Association, has proposed that
there should be zero cost of compliance for taxpayers.24 This is a
laudable objective, as costs of compliance can be quite high, espe-
cially for small vendors. A key to the zero-cost compliance proposal
is the provision of tax compliance software at government expense.
Because of the simplicity of the ideal system, the required software
would be substantially cheaper to produce, maintain, and operate
than under current law.25
5. The simplicity of the ideal RST 
Under the ideal system described above, the sales and use taxes
of all states would be essentially identical, except where state sover-
23. See Dan Sullivan et al., Submission by TAXWARE Int’l Inc. (visited Mar. 1, 2000)
<http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm> (submitted to the Advisory Commis-
sion on Electronic Commerce, San Francisco, December 15, 1999).
24. See National Governors’ Association, Streamlined Sales Tax System for the Twenty-
First Century (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://nga.org/internet/proposal.asp> (presented to
the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, San Francisco, December 15, 1999).
25. It should be noted that compliance has zero cost for the taxpayer; however, it is not
without cost to society. Under the proposal for zero-cost compliance, simplification would
reduce the cost to government, as well as to society.
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eignty is most important, in the setting of tax rates. There would be
a single, uniformly defined tax base. Purchases by business would be
exempt in all states, as long as they are eligible for deductions (or
similar treatment) under the federal income tax. Laws, regulations,
and administrative requirements and procedures would be the same
throughout the nation. Centralized reporting and the use of compli-
ance software would ease the burden of compliance. For firms with
sales below the de minimis threshold, the only burden would be cer-
tifying the level of sales (and, of course, being prepared to prove eli-
gibility for the de minimis exception).
B. Inherent Defects of the RST
The RST suffers from inherent defects, especially when imposed
by subnational governments, even if all states levy the ideal sales tax
described above. If inherent defects are important enough, perhaps
state and especially local governments should not rely on the retail
sales tax.
1. Inherent problems of implementing destination-based taxation
Sales taxes function best when local merchants sell primarily tan-
gible products to local customers, as was once the case. However, the
italicized words in the previous sentence no longer describe the way
the world actually functions. As a result, it is inherently difficult to
implement a destination-based sales tax.26
a. Cross-border shopping. Cross-border shopping violates the prin-
ciple that taxation should be based on the destination principle. Yet
there is not much that can be done about it, if creation of a single
market carries high priority. It is simply not acceptable to stop cars
(or pedestrians, cyclists, and passengers on interstate planes, trains,
buses, and boats) at state borders and perhaps search them for goods
being taken across state lines without paying sales tax of the state
where consumption will occur. In the case of goods being trans-
ported across the boundaries of local jurisdictions, implementation of
a destination-based local tax would be essentially infeasible, as well as
unacceptable on policy grounds.
Cross-border shopping across state lines is primarily problematic
where major metropolitan areas straddle state lines, as in the case of
26. These problems are not unique to the RST; they also occur under the VAT.
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New York City, St. Louis, and Kansas City. But cross-border shop-
ping between local jurisdictions is endemic, given the fragmentation
of cities. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the effects will be
minor or benign. If consumers shop in regional malls, substantial
amounts of revenue flow to the “wrong” jurisdiction (where people
shop, instead of where they live), as judged by the criterion of the
destination principle. If tax rates differ enough between jurisdictions
and consumers shop where rates are lowest, there may also be sig-
nificant distortions of decision-making.
b. Remote sales of tangible products. It is inherently more difficult
for remote vendors to comply with a duty to collect use tax than for
local vendors to meet sales tax obligations. Even if there is a uniform
tax base, remote vendors must know the destination (the state and
perhaps the locality) of their sales and the tax rate of every jurisdic-
tion where they make sales. It seems, however, that sales of tangible
products would not pose insurmountable problems under the ideal
system described above since each such sale has a mailing or “ship
to” address. The compliance problems of small remote vendors can
probably be handled satisfactorily by providing a de minimis exemp-
tion for firms with sales below a certain level. For larger firms, tax
compliance software can probably produce satisfactory results.27
c. Sales of digital content. Remote sales of digital content (e.g.
music, videos, software, and games) are especially troublesome.
Anonymity is a key characteristic of the Internet. As the famous car-
toon says, “On the Internet no one knows you are a dog.”28 With
anonymity goes the potential inability to determine the location of
27. There is one qualification and two exceptions to this optimistic assessment. First,
since jurisdictional boundaries and ZIP codes do not coincide, states must be more forgiving
when vendors make errors in identifying to the local level the destination of shipments. Under
a TTP system such errors would be the responsibility of the TTP. Second, while a “software
solution” works well when remittance is made by credit card (so the charge can be adjusted to
reflect applicable taxes) or is made in real time (so the tax due can be calculated before the sale
is consummated), it does not work if the purchaser wishes to pay with a check or money order
and the tax due is not determined in real time; there is no convenient way to communicate the
tax rates of thousands of local jurisdictions in a printed catalog. Third, it is necessary to decide
how to treat gifts. Conceptually defensible arguments can be made for taxation by the jurisdic-
tion where the donor lives or where the gifts are delivered. The former answer raises no new
issues. The latter compounds the first problem identified above, because gifts are sent to mul-
tiple jurisdictions. Moreover, it may not be available if digital content is sent to multiple loca-
tions, for example, if the donor prepays for the donee’s access to a predetermined amount of
digital content.
28. Peter Steiner, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.
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customers, and thus the potential inability of vendors to apply the
appropriate tax rates and remit revenue to the appropriate state and
local jurisdictions, the inability of tax administrators to audit these
transactions, and ultimately the ability of customers to purchase
digital content, especially from suppliers located off-shore, without
paying sales tax. Information currently being obtained to verify the
identity of purchasers using credit cards to make payments may be
adequate to identify the state and even the local jurisdiction of pur-
chasers. But the widespread advent of digital cash—not to mention
intentional routing of credit card bills through states that have no
sales tax or even foreign countries—may make this information un-
available or inaccurate. Thus, advocating destination-based taxation
of digital content may be a counsel of perfection, whether under the
RST or the VAT. It may be necessary to retreat to a conceptually
flawed compromise for sales of digital content by domestic suppliers,
such as imposition by the states acting in concert of a nationwide use
tax on digital content, with allocation of revenues among jurisdic-
tions on the basis of a formula.29
There is fear that an attempt to tax digital content would drive
vendors offshore, where they could take advantage of the anonymity
provided by the Internet to escape taxation. This risk may be over-
stated. Cooperation between the United States and other members
of the OECD may cut off this avenue of tax evasion. It appears to be
relatively simple to require foreign subsidiaries of domestic corpora-
tions (or of corporations headquartered in foreign countries willing
to cooperate in administration of such a system) to pay the uniform
use tax on sales of digital content.30 There would be problems in the
case of digital content sold by suppliers located in countries that are
unwilling to cooperate. It is worth remembering, however, that the
great bulk of digital content is bought by businesses and would not
be subject to sales or use tax under the conceptually ideal system.
The remaining gap would consist of sales of digital content to
29. This sentence raises a host of issues that cannot be examined in detail here. Such a
scheme would almost certainly be unconstitutional without the Congressional seal of approval
since the nationally uniform tax would exceed the tax on local sales in some jurisdictions.
However, with Congressional approval, it would almost certainly be constitutional. States
might choose to compensate consumers who pay use tax in excess of the local sales tax rate,
but probably would not.
30. Because of the difficulty of identifying the location of purchasers, it may be neces-
sary to employ a formula for this purpose.
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households by independent suppliers, probably a small part of the
potential sales tax base.
2. Political defects
The way the RST operates creates incentives for both govern-
ments and business to deviate from the ideal tax described above.
This does not mean that the ideal tax does not have the benefits at-
tributed to it—only that it is unlikely to be found in practice, or at
least less likely to be found than is a conceptually pure VAT.
a. The incentive to seek exemptions. Under the RST, if a sale is ex-
empt, that is the end of the story; the purchaser avoids the tax. Thus,
there is an incentive to try to gain exemptions, and no reason not to
do so. This stands in marked contrast to the VAT, where an exemp-
tion is advantageous only if sales are made to households. Even then,
it is less valuable than under the RST because only value that is
added at the retail stage escapes VAT. An exemption of pre-retail
sales actually increases aggregate taxation under the VAT, since no
credit is allowed for VAT paid on purchases by the exempt seller.31
b. The proclivity to tax sales to business. A retail sales tax yields the
same revenue with lower tax rates if sales to business are taxed than if
they are exempt. The tax on business inputs is hidden from public
view. Therefore, politicians have an incentive to tax sales to business
and not to eliminate such taxation if it already exists. Again, there is
generally no such incentive under the VAT, as credit is allowed for
tax paid on purchases by registered traders.32
Potentially offsetting the incentive to tax sales to business is the
adverse effect doing so has on the business climate of a state; a state
will be a more attractive place to invest if tax is not levied on capital
goods and/or other business inputs.33 How the forces for taxing and
not taxing business inputs will play out in a given state cannot be
known a priori, but it seems safe to say that the present situation il-
31. Zero-rating has quite different effects: none in the case of pre-retail transactions and
complete elimination of tax in the case of retail sales. See CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., THE
VALUE ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION? 72-75 (1987). Except for exports, zero-
rating is quite rare in the EU.
32. If anything, there is an incentive not to provide exemptions of sales to business, for
reasons noted earlier.
33. One of the most famous examples of the exit of investment caused by taxation of
capital investment involves Intel’s decision to locate a new microchip processing plant in New
Mexico, rather than in California where it would have been subject to sales tax.
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lustrates the tyranny of the status quo. Had sales to business never
been taxed, it is unlikely that they would be taxed now because of
the harm to the business climate. But for historical reasons, they are
currently taxed. The tax on business inputs, which is hidden, is not
likely to be rescinded in a revenue-neutral manner, because of the
need to raise tax rates on the remaining taxable sales to maintain
revenues.
C. Defects of the Actual RST
Besides the inherent problems described above, which are rela-
tively minor, the actual RST exhibits explicit defects that are not in-
herent but are substantially more important. As state sales taxes op-
erate in practice, they flagrantly violate all the primary criteria listed
above (economic neutrality, equity, simplicity, and transparency).
The complexity that plagues the sales tax “system” is especially im-
portant for present purposes because it stymies efforts to tax remote
commerce, including electronic commerce.
1. Failure to exempt all business inputs
States commonly do not attempt to exempt all sales to business;
rather, they provide exemptions on a selective basis.34 All states ex-
empt sales for resale, but the Multi-State Tax Commission’s
(MTC’s) draft “Uniform Resale Exemption Certificate” is far from
uniform. Most states also exempt products to be physically incorpo-
rated in a taxable product. Beyond that, policy on exemption of
business inputs is haphazard; various states exempt industrial fuels,
utilities, and agricultural inputs (e.g., fertilizer, seed, and farm im-
plements). Even where exemptions are facially identical, they may
not be similar. In short, the lack of a uniform exemption policy is the
source of considerable complexity for vendors operating in more
than one sales-tax state.
a. Certification of eligibility to make tax-exempt purchases: current
practice. In order to make tax-exempt purchases under the RST, as it
actually operates, a firm must file a resale (or similar) exemption cer-
34. This description is meant to indicate the nature of the problem; it is not intended to
be comprehensive. For a comprehensive description, see JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL,
SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 59-74 (2d ed.
1994).
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tificate with its supplier. In other words, to evade tax, a purchaser
must be willing, in the first instance, to lie to a supplier. It must also
be prepared to withstand audit—to show that the particular pur-
chases are eligible for an exemption. But the primary attention of
audits is on the vendor. There is no link to eligibility for federal in-
come tax deductions, and cannot be, given the haphazard structure
of exemptions for purchases of business inputs.
The situation is quite different under the VAT. All (non-exempt)
sales are subject to tax, without regard to the nature of the buyer.
Multiple tax on business purchases is avoided by allowing credits for
VAT on business purchases to be taken against VAT on sales. Thus,
the focus of audit is on the buyer, who must lie directly to the tax
authorities to evade tax. For both conceptual and organizational rea-
sons, the link to income tax administration is potentially much
closer.
b. Certification of eligibility to make tax-exempt purchases: the pro-
posal. The proposed system would tie exemption of business inputs
to eligibility for deduction (or similar treatment) under the federal
income tax; if the federal government allows a deduction for the ex-
penditure, it would be exempt from sales tax. While there is some
possibility of cheating by claiming federal tax deductions for what are
actually personal expenditures, doing so would require providing a
false employer identification number. Moreover, this type of cheat-
ing is likely to involve a relatively small amount of sales tax revenue.
After all, ordinarily far more is at stake in lost federal and state in-
come tax revenue than would be involved in failure to collect sales or
use tax. Moreover, states would retain the right to audit purchasers
claiming exemptions for business purchases.
2. Failure to tax all consumption
The typical state sales tax fails to tax all consumption; indeed, it
may tax less than half. Again, besides being bad policy on economic
grounds, the diversity of state practice creates needless complexity.35
a. Exemption of services. The tax treatment of goods and services
under the typical RST is quite asymmetrical. For the most part,
goods are taxed, unless explicitly exempted. By comparison, services
35. See generally id.
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are generally exempt, unless explicitly listed as subject to tax. (Intan-
gible products are typically not mentioned, but it generally can be
assumed that they are exempt.) While in theory the “exemption” ap-
proach applied to goods and the “enumeration” approach applied to
services could produce the same result, in fact they do not. Gener-
ally, goods are taxed, with some relatively common exceptions (e.g.,
for food and prescription medicine), and most services are exempt.
b. Exemption of goods. States differ considerably in which tangible
products they choose to tax. For example, many exempt food and
some exempt clothing. Moreover, some states provide exemptions
for clothes bought during a certain period of the year, to relieve the
burden of taxation on school clothes.36
c. Definition of exempt products. States do not define exempt
products the same way. Differences in the way food and clothing are
defined are legendary.37
d. Determination of tax base by local jurisdictions/local filing. Of
all the zany features of a zany system, perhaps the zaniest of all is al-
lowing local governments to define their own sales tax bases.38 There
is absolutely no excuse for allowing local governments to deviate
from the state definition of the tax base; any gain in local autonomy
is outweighed by the complexity inherent in this practice. The com-
plexity would be extremely burdensome for a taxpayer operating
stores in several localities in a given state;39 it would be an intolerable
burden on interstate trade if remote vendors were required to collect
local use taxes.
Almost as absurd is the practice of requiring taxpayers to file sales
and use tax returns with local governments. This does not even have
the redeeming quality of contributing to local autonomy; it merely
creates needless costs of compliance. All states should do what most
do: provide that local sales taxes be imposed as surcharges on the
state taxes, so that liabilities to local governments are reported to the
state, which distributes revenue among the local governments.
36. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 22.
37. See, e.g., Cline & Neubig, supra note 22.
38. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 34, at 277-318.
39. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce: Third Meeting, at 231 (visited
Mar. 1, 2000) <http://ecommercecommission.org/sanFran/tr1215.htm> (statement of
David Bullington, Vice President of Tax, Wal-Mart) (asserting that complying with the sales
tax requirements in two states required more resources than complying with the requirements
of 10 other states).
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3. De facto exemption of remote sales
Because of the complexity of the present system, the Supreme
Court, in Quill, ruled that remote vendors cannot be required to
collect use tax in states where they do not have a physical presence.40
While understandable, this decision produces results that violate
common sense, as well as accepted norms of tax policy: remote ven-
dors are favored relative to local merchants, horizontal and vertical
equity are violated, and the tax base is undermined. Neutrality be-
tween electronic commerce and traditional remote commerce would
require that the Quill doctrine be extended to the former. The fear
that this judicial doctrine might be applied to electronic commerce
causes considerable apprehension on Main Street and in state capi-
tals.
D. The Impact of Electronic Commerce
The advent of electronic commerce has called attention to the
defects of state sales and use taxes, especially the tax’s complexity and
its failure to tax remote commerce. In the first instance, loss of
revenues has been the primary concern; state and local government
officials fear that revenue will vanish into cyberspace, as commerce
shifts to the World Wide Web.41
Remote commerce—and thus electronic commerce—cannot be
taxed, as long as the system is so complicated. It is impossible to cre-
ate “technological neutrality” because of the structure of the existing
system. Should electronic commerce be taxed, like many sales on
Main Street, or should it be exempt, like most remote commerce?42
The key to a solution of these problems is enough simplification of
40. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). See also Walter Hellerstein,
State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425 (1997).
41. See NATHAN NEWMAN, PROP 13 MEETS THE INTERNET: HOW STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCES ARE BECOMING ROAD KILL ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
(Economic Democracy Information Network Report, Center for Community Economic Re-
search at U.C. Berkeley ed., 1995) (on file with author). Newman was an early doomsayer. See
Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why State and Local Revenues
Were Not Significantly Impacted by the Internet in 1998, 17 ST. TAX NOTES 43 (1999) for a
more realistic assessment. See also Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs
and Benefits of Taxing Internet Commerce, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 413 (1999).
42. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives,
Technological Constraints, and Tax Law, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997); Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
Achieving a Level Playing Field for Electronic Commerce, 14 ST. TAX NOTES 1767 (1998).
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
96
the sales and use tax that imposing an expanded duty to collect use
tax on remote vendors is not unreasonable.43
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TAXING
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Suggestions of how to tax electronic commerce depend on the
objectives sought. Some proposals, though motivated by the desire
to exempt electronic commerce, would exempt all remote com-
merce. Others are targeted more narrowly at electronic commerce.
An exemption could be either permanent or temporary. While some
would exempt electronic commerce only from use tax, others would
exempt it from sales tax. While I strongly oppose both a sales tax ex-
emption for electronic commerce and a permanent use tax exemp-
tion, I believe a temporary use tax moratorium is both inevitable and
desirable. Such a moratorium would allow the states time to simplify
their sales tax systems so that an expanded duty to collect use tax is
not unreasonable. But I do not believe such a moratorium should be
legislated.
A. Proposals to Exempt Electronic Commerce Permanently
A permanent exemption of electronic commerce is advocated for
a variety of identifiable reasons, none of which I find convincing.44
Some seem to believe that e-commerce is imbued with mysti-
cal—almost magical—properties that justify exemption. Advocacy of
an exemption for e-commerce smacks of central planning—the view,
largely discredited since the demise of the Soviet Union, that politi-
cians and bureaucrats (and industry spokespersons and editorialists in
this case) do better than markets in choosing what to produce and
how to produce and distribute it.45 There is little convincing evi-
dence or argumentation that external benefits, which cannot be
43. See National Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce, Tax Proj-
ect Final Report (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.ntanet.org>.
44. Advocates of exemption commonly parade a litany of fallacious arguments to sup-
port their position. My refutation of many of them, from Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Taxation
of Electronic Commerce: Background and Proposal, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, TAXES AND CONTRACTS (Nicholas Imparato ed., forthcoming 2000), is included as
Appendix A.
45. I find it anomalous that the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal is the most
prominent situs of this dirigist view of the world. See, e.g., The E-Grinch, Editorial, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 29, 1999, at A28.
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captured by the private sector, exist and are important enough to
justify a permanent exemption.46 If external benefits do not exist or
are not important, an exemption would cause undesirable distortions
in the conduct of business, for example, by encouraging uneconom-
ical methods of distribution. Thus, I agree with what Ronald Reagan
said in 1981, that “[t]he taxing power of government must be used
to provide revenues for legitimate government purposes. It must not
be used to regulate the economy or bring about social change.”47
Another (somewhat cynical) view is that a permanent exemption
would force politicians to reduce sales taxes in response to com-
plaints from Main Street merchants about unfair treatment. How-
ever, a permanent exemption would impose windfall losses on Main
Street merchants. No matter how much one desires lower tax rates, I
do not think it appropriate to sacrifice Main Street on the altar of
sales tax reduction.
Just before the San Francisco meeting of the Advisory Commis-
sion on Electronic Commerce (ACEC) on December 14–15, 1999,
a small group of tax specialists, fearing that the Commission might
advocate a permanent exemption for e-commerce, sent e-mails to a
hurriedly assembled list of academic tax specialists asking them to
support an appeal to the Commission to oppose a permanent ex-
emption.48 By the time the appeal was submitted to the Commission
in fewer than three business days, fifty-five academic tax specialists
had expressed their support for it. Support has continued to grow,
and by early February 2000 more than 170 academic tax specialists
and two recipients of the Nobel Prize in economics (Kenneth Arrow
and James Tobin) had endorsed the appeal. Particularly noteworthy
is the fact that, with three easily-explained exceptions, every Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) of the Treasury for Tax Analysis (the high-
est tax policy position normally held by an economist) since 1975, as
well as one Assistant Secretary and two DASs for Tax Policy (posi-
46. It is quite common for advocates of exemption to cite the work of Austan Goolsbee,
although Goolsbee is quite clear that he supports, at most, a temporary exemption.  See Gools-
bee & Zittrain, supra note 41.
47. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS.
131, 137 (Feb. 18, 1981).
48. The “Appeal for Fair and Equal Taxation of Electronic Commerce,” including the
list of signatories as of December 29, 1999, is included as Appendix B to this paper. Besides
urging the ACEC not to propose a permanent exemption for electronic commerce, the appeal
advocates destination-based taxation of sales, simplification, and elimination of compliance
burdens on vendors making small amounts of sales.
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tions held by tax lawyers) support the appeal.49 It is clear that a per-
manent exemption of electronic commerce has virtually no support
among academic tax professionals.
1. Codification/extension of Quill
Under current judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, e-
commerce in tangible products would benefit from the protection of
Quill. Although there is some uncertainty whether the Quill doc-
trine would also apply to remote sales of digital content, most seem
to believe that it would. If Quill does cover these sales, nothing need
be done to create an effective exemption of electronic commerce that
crosses state boundaries; Quill will be the law of the land unless and
until it is overturned. Yet some are not content with the status quo;
they would like to codify Quill and perhaps broaden the protection it
provides.
a. Codification. Codification of Quill would have the advantage
of converting tax evasion to tax avoidance; those who do not pay use
tax on purchases from remote vendors would no longer be breaking
the law. But codification has an enormous disadvantage. Whereas the
Supreme Court could conceivably overturn its decision in Quill, if
the states were to simplify the sales taxes, it seems extremely unlikely
that the Court would overturn a codification of that decision, which
the Congress would presumably enact pursuant to powers granted
by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.50 Thus, failing legisla-
tive repeal of the codification, the nation would be left with an in-
defensible but permanent exemption of remote commerce, even if
the sales taxes are simplified dramatically. Since a moratorium should
be only temporary, until the states simplify their sales and use taxes,
it would be a mistake to codify the Quill decision.
b. Extension. Dean Andal, a member of the ACEC, has advocated
legislation that would extend the protection provided by Quill in
several ways.51 It would substitute “substantial physical presence” for
49. Only one DAS for Tax Analysis who did not sign is an academic; he says he does not
sign anything. Relatively few of those who have held the positions of Assistant Secretary or
DAS for Tax Policy are academics.
50. In Quill, the Court urged Congress to substitute its own nexus test if Congress did
not like the Court’s decision. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 514 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
Codifying Quill could be reasonably interpreted as answering that challenge.
51. See Dean Andal, A Uniform Jurisdictional Standard: Applying the Substantial Physi-
cal Presence Standard to Electronic Commerce (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.ecom-
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the “physical presence” bright-line test of “substantial nexus” in
Quill, list specific activities that would not be deemed to constitute
nexus, and extend the protection of Quill to business activities taxes
(essentially corporate income taxes).
Andal’s approach would be even worse than mere codification of
Quill, the faults of which it shares. First, raising the threshold for
nexus to “substantial physical presence” would lead to a flood of liti-
gation, as taxpayers test the limits of this new standard. Second,
some of the activities in Andal’s “safe harbor” list clearly should con-
stitute nexus; the presence of a corporate affiliate in the taxing state
is one.52 In short, the Andal proposal should be rejected.
2. Exemption of “electronic commerce”
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) has introduced legislation that
would amend the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) to provide that
state and local governments could not impose “sales or use taxes for
domestic or foreign goods or services acquired through electronic
commerce.”53 Congressmen John Kasich and John Boehner (both
R-Ohio) have proposed a virtually identical prohibition, which they
call the “Internet Tax Elimination Act” (I-TEA).54 These two pro-
posals would exempt all electronic commerce, even if conducted by a
vendor that has nexus in the state.
One can examine these proposals under two scenerios: first, un-
der the naïve assumption that what we now think of as electronic
commerce is all that would be exempt and second, under the more
realistic assumption that business practices would adjust to take ac-
count of the exemption of electronic commerce.
a. The naïve view: getting the economics wrong. Some want to ex-
empt electronic commerce because they believe it to be the source of
increased productivity. But the logical implication of this belief is not
that all electronic commerce should be exempt, but that all sales to
business should be exempt. Consider Figure 1, which shows a four-
way division of commerce among (a) electronic and traditional
mercecommission.org/document/andaluniformstd.pdf>.
52. See Michael J. McIntyre, Taxing Electronic Commerce Fairly and Efficiently, 52 TAX
L. REV. 625 (1997) (the defects of “entity isolation”—the view that what I call “nexus by af-
filiation” is not automatic). I do not comment on the extension of Quill to business activities
taxes, as doing so would take me too far afield.
53. S. 1611, 106th Cong. (1999).
54. H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. (1999).
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commerce and (b) sales to business and sales to households. Cell 1,
business-to-business transactions in electronic commerce—some-
times called B2B—is where most electronic commerce is occurring.
It is also the source of most of the gains in productivity attributable
to electronic commerce. By comparison, electronic sales to house-
holds in Cell 3 are relatively small and not likely to be the source of
great gains in productivity.
This figure assists in understanding the difference between my
proposal and the proposal to exempt all electronic commerce. I
would exempt all sales to business—the first row of the figure—while
an exemption for all electronic commerce would apply to the first
column.
Although exemption of all electronic commerce would avoid im-
peding B2B transactions in electronic commerce, it would discrimi-
nate against Main Street merchants making sales to either businesses
or consumers. The conceptually correct solution of exempting all
sales to business achieves the primary objective of allowing B2B
commerce to develop tax-free, but without discriminating against
traditional sales to either business or households.
Figure 1





Sales to business 1.  Electronic sales
     to business
2.  Traditional sales
     to business
Sales to households 3.  Electronic sales
     to households
4.  Traditional sales
     to households
b. The realistic view: gutting the sales tax. The definition of elec-
tronic commerce in legislation providing an exemption is crucial.
Since the McCain bill and I-TEA would amend the Internet Tax
Freedom Act (ITFA), they rely implicitly on the definition of elec-
tronic commerce contained in Section 1104 of the ITFA: “Elec-
tronic commerce.—The term ‘electronic commerce’ means any
transaction conducted over the Internet or through Internet access,
comprising the sale, lease, license, offer, or delivery of property,
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goods, services, or information, whether or not for consideration,
and includes the provision of Internet access.”55 It appears that, un-
der this definition, all that is required for classification as electronic
commerce is interposition of a connection to the Internet between
the order and delivery of a product. For example, a customer in a
department store might identify a product in a showroom and use a
terminal sitting on the counter to order the product over the Inter-
net for pickup at the check-out counter a few minutes later. As far-
fetched as this example seems, it was approved by Chris Wysocki, the
advocate of the I-TEA before the San Francisco meeting of the
ACEC on December 14, 1999.56 If enacted, such a proposal could
essentially eliminate the sales tax. This, it appears, is the objective of
some who support his approach.57
B. A Temporary Exemption for Electronic Commerce: Reliance on
Quill
One can identify at least two arguments for a temporary exemp-
tion for electronic commerce: First, a temporary exemption would
provide a chance for this potentially vital industry to grow. Second, a
temporary exemption would allow time for development and imple-
mentation of a rational long-run tax policy toward e-commerce,
which would require simplification of the state sales and use taxes.
I do not believe that exemption is needed to spur growth of an
industry that is growing more rapidly—and producing billionaires
more quickly—than any in history. On the other hand, given the
currently disastrous complexity of the state sales taxes, a temporary
moratorium for e-commerce that crosses state lines is probably in-
evitable, as well as appropriate. The Supreme Court is not likely to
require remote vendors engaged in electronic commerce to collect
use taxes that reflect the current complexity of the sales taxes, nor
55. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104(3), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998).
56. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce: Third Meeting, at 253-55 (visited
Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org/sanFran/tr1214.htm> (statement
of Chris Wysocki, President, Small Business Survival Committee).
57. Witness the following exchange between Mr. Pincus, the Commerce Department
representative on the ACEC, and Mr. Wysocki:
“Mr. Pincus: . . . . [W]ouldn’t every store owner of any size in America have
integrated the Internet into their business in a way that there wouldn’t be any sales
tax?
Mr Wysocki: It would be a good idea.”
Id. at 254-55.
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should it. If, however, sales and use taxes can be simplified to the
point that collection of use taxes is not an unreasonable requirement
to impose on remote vendors, either the Supreme Court or the
Congress may—and should—overturn Quill. In short, until over-
turned either judicially or legislatively, Quill provides a de facto
moratorium against use tax on electronic commerce that crosses state
lines.
Quill does not provide a satisfactory long-run solution. Besides
producing a result that is undesirable on economic grounds, it cre-
ates a nation of scoff-laws. Under the Quill doctrine, the use tax is a
tax on honesty, and individuals are forced to choose between break-
ing the law and feeling they are the only ones who do not. Reliance
on Quill may, however, be a reasonable short-run strategy. It avoids
at least two risks: (a) that a temporary statutory exemption would
become permanent and (b) that an exemption statute would be
poorly drafted, either by inadvertence or by design, creating undesir-
able and perhaps unintended consequences.
C. Proposals to Tax Electronic Commerce by Tinkering with the System
Some would simplify the existing system enough to gain volun-
tary compliance by vendors who lack nexus under Quill or either
Congressional approval or judicial sanction of a requirement that
remote vendors collect use tax. The National Governors’ Association
(NGA), in its submission to the ACEC, has proposed a package of
reforms that it believes would elicit voluntary collection of use tax.
Its package includes the following: (a) a menu of potentially taxable
products, based on state adoption of uniform definitions of products.
This approach avoids the need for states to adopt a uniform tax base,
and thus preserves substantial state sovereignty over the tax base; (b)
menus for the tax treatment of various items when bought by busi-
ness firms or non-profit organizations. Given that different industries
make different uses of various things they purchase, the menu for
business purchases might have refinements not found in the menu
for sales to households; (c) administrative simplification, such as joint
audits; (d) use of trusted third parties (TTPs), which would be re-
sponsible for ascertaining tax liabilities, depending on the product
and the characteristics and location of the buyer; (e) state compensa-
tion for the cost of compliance, including the cost of obtaining and
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maintaining compliance software from TTPs.58
I believe this approach does not go far enough; when the NGA
proposal mentions “uniform laws,” it apparently means uniform
definitions and menus, not a uniform and rational tax base or truly
uniform laws and regulations. While a uniform menu of what might
be taxable would clearly be an improvement over the present system,
which lacks even uniform definitions, this approach forswears the
massive simplification that would result from exempting all business
purchases and taxing all consumption spending by households.59
There could be as few as a dozen items or as many as 10,000 items
(or more) in the menu, depending on the level of aggregation in
constructing the menu.60 Of course, the more aggregation, the closer
the system is to a uniform base, the simpler the system, and the more
incursion into state fiscal sovereignty. Conversely, the less aggrega-
tion, the more complex the system will remain.
The NGA proposal is rather sketchy in its description of the TTP
approach. One thing is certain: the compliance software the TTPs
would need is far more complicated and costly than if the tax were
simplified along the lines of the ideal system.61 The NGA proposal
for elimination of the compliance burden shifts avoidable social costs
of compliance to state governments, rather than eliminating them, as
under the proposal for fundamental reform.
Noticeably missing from the NGA proposal is the unification of
local use tax rates, which business contends is essential. Adoption of
“one rate per state” would greatly simplify compliance and admini-
stration. But it would also seriously undermine local fiscal autonomy
if extended to sales tax rates.62 A compromise might be to allow local
determination of sales tax rates, but require a uniform use tax rate in
each state. Unless the use tax rate were set to equal the lowest sales
tax rate in the state, this would require congressional approval, as
there would be otherwise unconstitutional discrimination against
58. See National Governors’ Association, supra note 24.
59. I would liken this to giving a pair of crutches that are too short to someone with a
broken leg; they may be able to walk, but only bent over, haltingly, and not far; the only satis-
factory solution is to set the broken bone and let it heal, so the patient can walk normally.
60. The Final Report of the National Tax Association Project describes the menu ap-
proach in greater detail. See Final Report, supra note 43.
61. Concern has also been expressed that the TTP system would create an unacceptable
threat to privacy.
62. Some local governments have pledged sales tax revenues to the service of debt in-
curred to finance capital projects, such as stadiums.
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
104
interstate commerce in local jurisdictions where the use tax rate ex-
ceeded the sales tax rate.
D. Fundamental Reform of the Sales Tax
I have advocated a significantly different approach—one that ad-
dresses the need for simplification by proposing adoption of the con-
ceptual ideal. Given the discussion of Section III.A, as well as the de-
scription and justification of the system in Appendix C, I can be
brief.63 The proposed system would have these features:64
•Exemption of all sales to business
•Taxation of all sales to households
•State and local autonomy over tax rates
•Identical administrative requirements and procedures
•Centralization of compliance, probably in the vendor’s state of
commercial domicile
•A de minimis rule to eliminate the compliance burden on small
vendors
Once a sufficient number of states (or states representing the
lion’s share of the market for sales by remote vendors) have adopted
the uniform system, it would be appropriate to petition Congress to
allow any state adopting the uniform system to require remote ven-
dors to collect use tax. An alternative, but riskier, strategy would be
for states to adopt the proposed system and challenge the Supreme
Court to revisit Quill by attempting to impose a duty to collect. The
voluntary approach espoused by the NGA could probably also be
employed to implement this system.
63. This is my proposal to the ACEC, presented at its meeting in San Francisco on De-
cember 15, 1999. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Radical Simplification of State Sales and Use
Taxes: the Prerequisite for an Expanded Duty to Collect Use Tax on Remote Sales: A Proposal to
the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (visited Feb. 12, 2000)
<http:www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm>.
64. I describe the pure system. If there are to be exceptions to the proposed tax base,
the exceptions should be adopted by all states, so that the tax base is uniform, if not ideal. Use
of something like the TTP might also be needed.
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V. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
Although the sales tax is the most important source of tax reve-
nues for state governments, and an important source for local gov-
ernments, it is not the only possible source. This section considers
two: a switch from the RST to the VAT and replacement of revenues
from the RST with revenues from the income tax.
A. The “Other” Sales Tax: the VAT
Some have suggested that the conceptually pure sales tax I have
proposed sounds a lot like a value added tax. Actually, this is not
true. The intent and effects of the VAT and the RST system I have
proposed are similar, but the techniques by which they would be
achieved are different. In the interest of completeness, I briefly de-
scribe in Appendix D how a state VAT might be implemented. I do
not include a description in this text because I do not believe the
VAT to be a viable option for the American states and do not want
to divert attention to it.65
Substitution of a VAT for the state RSTs would be an extremely
radical proposal—much more radical than my proposal for adoption
by all states of an RST that is uniform in all respects except tax rates.
The mechanics of the VAT and the RST are quite different.
(Whereas the RST uses exemptions to eliminate tax on business pur-
chases, the VAT uses tax credits.) As a result of the need to intro-
duce new methods of accounting and to retrain personnel involved
in both compliance and administration, this is not a change that
should be undertaken lightly. Moreover, it would be difficult—and
probably impossible—to impose local surcharges on the state VAT.
A state VAT is not something I am ready to propose.66
65. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing Subnational Value Added Taxes on Inter-
nal Trade: The Compensating VAT (CVAT),  INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. (forthcoming) [herein-
after McClure, CVAT]; see also Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing a State VAT: Breaking
the Logjam in Tax Assignment, 1999 NAT’L TAX ASS’N (forthcoming) [hereinafter McClure,
Breaking the Logjam].
66. Thus, The Economist is simply wrong when it says I favor a European-style value-
added tax. See The Happy E-Shopper, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 14.
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B. Another Alternative: Expanded State and Local Taxation of Income
Some have suggested that the individual income tax may be a
more satisfactory source of revenue for state and local governments
than the sales and use tax.67 This section examines that possibility.68
1. Substitution of income tax for state and local sales taxes
Individual income taxes can be an attractive way to finance state
and local governments. This is often overlooked by those who think
of income taxes in terms of income distribution and macroeconomic
stabilization, functions that must be discharged primarily at the na-
tional level. Income taxes can also act as a form of benefit tax, fi-
nancing the generalized benefits of public services provided by sub-
national governments. Since individuals are likely to consume public
services—and to vote where they live, and not where they work—in-
come taxation should be levied primarily by the state of residence,
not the state of employment. A residence-based income tax is similar
to a destination-based sales tax in this regard.69 The question, then,
is whether residence-based taxation of income by subnational gov-
ernments is feasible.
Experience in forty-four states clearly shows that a residence-
67. See Hal Varian, A Proposal to Eliminate Sales and Use Taxes (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm>; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Electronic
Commerce and the State Retail Sales Tax: A Challenge to American Federalism, 6 INT’L TAX
AND PUB. FIN. 193, 202 (1999) (“[T]he case for subnational use of sales taxes is not as clear
as has sometimes been suggested. This is especially true in the case of use by local govern-
ments, which would better be financed by residence-based surcharges on individual income
taxes, as is common in Europe.”).
68. This discussion ignores almost as many questions as it addresses. First, if state and
local governments were to abandon the sales tax, it might be appropriate for the federal gov-
ernment to move into that field. In that case, a federal VAT would probably be preferable to a
federal RST. See MCLURE, supra note 31. Second, this discussion pertains only to the individ-
ual income tax; there are many good reasons why the corporate income tax is not a good state
tax and is a horrible local tax. See McLure, supra note 5. Third, there is no suggestion that the
income tax should not continue to be used by the federal government. Elimination of the fed-
eral income tax would pose serious problems for implementation of the state and local taxes.
See Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative Federal Con-
sumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361 (1997). Lastly, whereas
the federal income tax would presumably have graduated rates, the subnational income taxes
might be levied at a single rate. Moreover, lower tax thresholds might be appropriate for the
subnational taxes, for reasons explained in the text.
69. It might be noted in passing that an income tax tends automatically to eliminate the
taxation of business inputs, which are deductible, and differential taxation based on the com-
position of the household’s market basket.
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based state income tax is feasible. Moreover, experience in more than
a dozen of those states indicates that a residence-based local income
tax is also feasible. Local income taxes are commonly levied as sur-
charges on state taxes, which rely heavily on administration of the
federal tax. Indeed, it is vastly simpler to collect residence-based in-
come taxes than to collect use taxes based on the destination of sales
of tangible products, let alone digital products. Moreover, the in-
come tax does not suffer from defects equivalent to cross-border
shopping in the sales tax area.
The primary reason for not favoring substitution of state and lo-
cal income taxes for the sales and use tax is the tyranny of the status
quo; such a wholesale switch in tax policy would cause wrenching
adjustments. At this late date it seems better to attempt to reform
the sales and use tax along the lines outlined earlier than to pursue
this even more radical option.
A further problem with greater state and local reliance on the in-
come tax is the fact that, as currently structured, the typical state in-
come tax is not a mass tax related roughly to benefits of government
services, which is required for responsible government, as the sales
tax is. The great bulk of the federal income tax is paid by those in the
top ten percent of the income distribution.70 Even though the ten-
dency toward less highly graduated rates in state taxes reduces the
concentration of tax liabilities, the concentration still exists. Liability
for state and local income tax is not likely to be closely related to
benefits, unless tax thresholds are lowered substantially, a change
many would find objectionable on distribution grounds. A system
with two-thresholds, one for federal tax and one for state and local
taxes, would also complicate compliance and administration.71
2. A hybrid: substitution of income tax for only local sales taxes
Another combination of reforms is worth considering: continued
use of the sales tax by the states, combined with abandonment of the
sales and use tax, in favor of expanded use of the income tax by local
70. See Table 7: Individual Income Tax Rates and Tax Shares,  SOI BULLETIN, Spring
1999, at 37.
71. Note the difference in these two policies, which could be structured to have equiva-
lent distributional consequences: (a) providing transfers to the poor, who then pay sales tax on
their purchases, and (b) exempting the poor from payment of income tax. In the first case, the
poor face the tax price of government services, but in the second case they do not.
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governments.72 Under this scenario, states would employ the ideal
sales tax. Without the need to attribute sales to local jurisdictions
and collect and remit local use taxes, compliance would be much
easier for remote vendors than under current law.73 This variant
would eliminate the problem of cross-border shopping between local
jurisdictions, where it is most troublesome.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A SUMMARY EVALUATION
To clarify thinking about tax policy, academic tax specialists
sometimes consider what type of tax system they would propose in a
colony to be established on Mars.74 Given that assignment, I would
rank the systems considered thus far for the finance of state and local
government as follows, dividing them into three groups, with prob-
lems listed under each:
Acceptable systems:
1. Residence-based state and local income taxes.
Problems: Potential failure to serve as benefit-related tax
at low income levels.
2. The conceptually ideal destination-based RST described in
Section III.
Problems:
a.  Cross-border shopping.
b. Complexity of compliance with local sales and use tax
surcharges.
72. In states where there is no income tax, local income taxes could be imposed as a
percentage of a measure of income taken from the federal income tax return. While federal
adjusted gross income might seem to be the most logical choice, for reasons suggested above,
that choice would require many who have incomes below the federal tax threshold to file local
tax returns. Thus, the use of taxable income as the base for local income taxes in these states
seems almost inevitable.
73. Perhaps I should state emphatically that this splitting off of the local tax should not
be used as an excuse to retain the current, horribly complicated, and irrational state sales tax;
the proposed reforms should be enacted, even in this case. On the other hand, under this sce-
nario, the state VAT looks somewhat better.
74. They might also ask what they would propose for the American colonies, if they
were on the Mayflower and knew then what they know now. That is something of a stretch, as
it is hard to imagine knowing about the Internet while on the Mayflower.
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c. Difficulty of destination-based taxation of digital con-
tent.
3. The hybrid state sales tax/residence-based local income
tax considered at the end of the previous section.
Problems:
a.  Potential failure of the income tax to serve as benefit-
related tax at low income levels.
b. Difficulty of destination-based sales taxation of digital
content.
Acceptable for less developed countries (LDCs) and coun-
tries in transition from socialism, but not the United States:
4. A destination-based state VAT implemented by use of
CVAT (described in Appendix D).
Problems:
a.  Impossibility of local surcharges.
b. Cross-border shopping.
c. Difficulty of destination-based taxation of all remote
sales to households.
Deeply flawed and unacceptable systems:
5. The “simplified” RST system that would result from
adopting proposals to tinker with the present system (de-
scribed in Section IV.C).
Problems:
a.  Same as the conceptually ideal RST (#2 above):
•Cross-border shopping.
•Complexity of compliance with local sales tax sur-
charges.
•Difficulty of destination-based taxation of digital
content.
b. Taxation of many business inputs.
c.  Exemption of much consumption spending.
d.  Wasteful cost of complexity is shifted to governments,
not  eliminated.
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6.  The present RST system.
Problems:
a.  Same as the simplified RST (#5 above):
•Cross-border shopping.
•Complexity of compliance with local sales tax sur-
charges.
•Difficulty of destination-based taxation of digital
content.
•Taxation of many business inputs.
•Exemption of much consumption spending.
b.  Onerous and wasteful cost of compliance.
c.  Avoidance of tax on much remote commerce, due to
Quill.
7.  An RST system that codifies and extends Quill.
Problems: 
a.  Same as the present RST (#6 above):
•Cross-border shopping.
•Complexity of compliance with local sales tax sur-
charges.
•Difficulty of destination-based taxation of digital
content.
•Taxation of many business inputs.
•Exemption of much consumption spending.
•Onerous and wasteful cost of compliance
•Avoidance of tax on much remote commerce, due
to Quill.
b.  Improper extension of Quill protection.
•Where a corporate affiliate of a remote vendor is
present in the state.
8.  An RST system that exempts all electronic commerce.
Problems: Essentially eliminates the sales tax by making it
voluntary.
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Since I have not been reticent in my condemnation of the last
four systems, I do not consider them further, except to note that no
responsible adviser would propose any of them for adoption de novo.
The only advantage they have is that they take the existing system as
their starting point—admittedly not an inconsiderable advantage.
Given the question posed in the title of this paper—and quixotic op-
timism appropriate for the imminent start of a new millennium—I
limit myself to the first three options, assuming that radical reform of
the sales tax is possible. Because the VAT is not conducive to use as a
source of local revenue and employs tax sharing, rather than destina-
tion-based taxation, for remote sales to households, I classify it as in-
appropriate for use in the United States, but perhaps not in less de-
veloped countries and countries in transition from socialism.
For reasons described briefly at the end of the last section, for
the colony on Mars I would rank the state and local income tax
slightly above the conceptually ideal RST I have proposed. The in-
come tax avoids the troublesome problems of cross-border shopping
and use taxes, especially on digital content, that plague even a con-
ceptually pure RST. Since the status quo ante on Mars would be an
empty page, there would be no problems of transition. The primary
problem with the income tax is the difficulty of making those with
low incomes aware of tax prices of public services. The hybrid, in
which states employ the ideal sales tax and local governments employ
the income tax, would also work, especially if the states also imposed
income taxes.
But we are not on our way to Mars; we are merely on the way to
2001 on Earth. Thus we cannot blithely ignore the status quo. States
already rely on the RST for about one-third of tax revenue, and
abandoning that tax in favor of greater reliance on the income tax
would cause wrenching adjustments. This leads me to rank the con-
ceptually pure RST above the state and local income tax, despite its
clear problems. In short, I believe we should fix the state sales tax,
not discard it. But the “fix” requires radical reform; tinkering will
not suffice. Finally, consideration might be given to the hybrid solu-
tion involving continued state use of the sales tax and increased reli-
ance on the income tax by local governments, since many of the
most serious remaining problems of sales and use taxation (cross-
border shopping and the difficulty of attributing sales to local juris-
dictions) involve the local tax, not the state tax.
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APPENDIX A
Fallacious Arguments for a Permanent Exemption for
Electronic Commerce75
“Remote vendors do not consume services.” Some argue that re-
mote vendors should not be required to collect use taxes because
they do not consume public services provided by the market states.
This view reflects a misunderstanding of the benefit principle of
taxation. The sales and use tax is levied primarily to finance services
provided to households, not to finance services provided to business
firms doing business in the taxing state. Thus it should apply equally
to all taxable goods and services consumed in the state, not only to
those sold by local merchants. (The invalidity of the argument cited
above can be seen by replacing reference to the sales and use tax with
reference to an excise on tobacco products used to finance health
care for smokers. No one would seriously suggest that cigarettes sent
by mail order from another state should not be taxed, just because
they are sold by a vendor that receives few services in the taxing
state.76)
“Shipping and handling compensate for the lack of use tax.” Some
argue that the need to pay charges for shipping and handling, which
are higher for shipments to individual customers than for bulk ship-
ments to local merchants, compensates for the lack of use tax on re-
mote sales.77 This argument is obviously invalid in the case of digit-
ized content; there are no shipping and handling charges to offset
the lack of use tax. But it is equally invalid in the case of tangible
products. The easy case involves a comparison of two remote ven-
dors, one with nexus and one without. Shipping and handling costs
75. This Appendix is taken from McLure, supra note 44; see also Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
How—and Why—the States Should Tax Electronic Commerce 18 ST. TAX NOTES 129 (2000).
76. An admittedly unrealistic example illustrates the argument. Suppose that it were pos-
sible to sell motor fuel in a state without having a physical presence there. Suppose further that
a tax on motor fuels consumed by motorists in the state is used to finance the construction and
maintenance of roads and highways in the state. Should fuel sold in the state by a remote ven-
dor be taxed? Of course it should; the tax is intended to charge for the in-state motorist’s use
of highways.
77. Given the attention paid to the difficulty of returning merchandise to e-commerce
vendors following the Christmas of 1999, one can expect that difficulty to be added to the
costs e-vendors incur that offset the sales tax advantage. Of course, the reasoning is fallacious,
for reasons stated in the text.
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may be comparable, but one collects tax and the other does not. Fi-
nally, consider the more difficult case: comparison of a remote ven-
dor and a Main Street merchant. If costs are higher for remote
commerce, the ability for remote vendors to compete successfully
because of Quill is prima facie evidence that the de facto tax exemp-
tion induces economic inefficiency; costs are being incurred that
would not exist if tax policy were neutral.
The previous two arguments (involving lack of services to remote
vendors and shipping costs) may not be convincing to non-
economists. But consider the following. Suppose someone suggested
that sales (or use) tax should be collected if Americans buy foreign-
made cars from American merchants, but not if they order the cars
directly from a foreign manufacturer—or that sales tax should be
collected on cars made in the United States, but not on cars made
abroad. Few would think these suggestions make sense. Yet they are
exactly analogous to arguments that purchases from out-of-state
vendors should not be taxed: that is, foreign merchants and car
manufacturers do not consume services provided by the American
states and they incur substantial shipping costs getting their products
to American markets. Yet we do not consider either fact in deciding
whether to collect sales or use tax on foreign-made cars.
“Main Street merchants are going on-line.” There are at least
three reasons not to draw solace from the fact that many Main Street
merchants are joining the stampede to electronic commerce. First,
this is small comfort to local merchants that do not establish an on-
line presence, likely to be the smallest and most vulnerable. Second,
unless local merchants that go on-line place the electronic commerce
aspects of business in a separate subsidiary incorporated in another
state, they must charge sales tax. The need to isolate online business
in a separate out-of-state corporation distorts business operations, for
example, because accepting refunds at the Main Street location is
likely to create nexus for the e-commerce affiliate. Third, if the on-
line strategy is successful, revenue losses will be far greater than the
optimistic scenarios that assume that not much taxable consumption
spending shifts to the Internet.
“Taxing electronic commerce would hinder the growth of small e-
commerce firms.” No sensible proposal to impose an expanded duty
to collect use tax would negatively affect small e-commerce vendors.
First, there would be a de minimis exemption that would eliminate
the duty to collect for small vendors. Second, the author’s proposal
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to eliminate tax on sales to business implies that taxes on such ven-
dors would be lower, not higher.
“The European Union is shifting to origin-based taxation.” Some
suggest that it would be appropriate to apply origin-based taxation
to electronic commerce because the European Union (EU) is shift-
ing from destination-based taxation to origin-based taxation under
the value-added tax (VAT). Nothing could be further from the
truth.78 The EU has recently determined that digital content down-
loaded from the Internet should be taxed as a supply of services. For
historical reasons, services have been subject to origin-based taxation
in the EU. (They have not been exempt, as in the typical American
states sales tax.) But, the EU has also recently decided to move to
destination-based taxation of services, in large part to prevent the
loss of revenue implied by origin-based taxation. Thus, like goods
and other services, digital content will be subject to destination-
based taxation in the EU.
“It is not necessary to tax electronic commerce, because the states
have surpluses.” This assertion reflects an implicit assumption that
taxation of electronic commerce would be the source of additional
revenue—that taxing electronic commerce would increase taxes.
(This assumption is encouraged by the lament of state and local offi-
cials that revenues will drop if electronic commerce is not taxed.) I
believe that this is not the way to frame the issue—that it makes
much more sense to discuss the taxation of electronic commerce in a
revenue-neutral context. In that context, the existence of a surplus is
irrelevant; rates could be lower if e-commerce is taxed than if it is
not.
“The development of electronic commerce is driving the recent eco-
nomic expansion.” Some attribute the recent expansion of the Ameri-
can economy to the development of electronic commerce. However,
no evidence is offered to support the proposition, other than the fact
that the two phenomena are occurring simultaneously. Electronic
commerce may indeed be one factor that is fueling the expansion.
But parsing out its contribution requires careful econometric analysis
that attempts to control systematically for other influences that are
occurring simultaneously, a difficult enterprise that would challenge
78. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce: Third Meeting, supra note 56, at
25-34 (statement of Michel Aujean, Director of Tax Policy, European Commission) (dispelling
any remaining doubts on this score).
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the best econometricians; it is not something that can be achieved by
casual observation.
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APPENDIX B
Appeal for Fair and Equal Taxation of Electronic
Commerce79
We the undersigned academic specialists in tax policy, having no
direct interest in the outcome of the deliberations of the Advisory
Commission on Electronic Commerce, are concerned that the
Commission may make recommendations for the tax treatment of
electronic commerce that are contrary to the public interest. We
therefore respectfully suggest that any recommendations the Com-
mission makes regarding the sales and use tax should satisfy all four
of the following general principles, which are consistent with a vari-
ety of specific proposals:
1. Electronic commerce should not permanently be treated dif-
ferently from other commerce. There is no principled reason for a
permanent exemption for electronic commerce. Electronic com-
merce should be taxed neither more nor less heavily than other
commerce.
2. Remote sales, including electronic commerce, should, to the
extent possible, be taxed by the state of destination of sales, regard-
less of whether the vendor has a physical presence in the state. In
limited cases, where it is impossible to determine the destination of
sales of digital content to households, it may be necessary to substi-
tute a surrogate system. In no case should taxation of remote com-
merce or electronic commerce be limited to origin-based taxation,
which would induce a “race to the bottom” and, in effect, no taxa-
tion at all.
3. There must be enough simplification of sales and use taxes to
make destination-based taxation of sales feasible. Such simplification
might include, for example, unification of the tax bases across states,
unification of tax rates within states, and/or sourcing of sales only to
the state level, as well as simplification of administrative procedures.
4. A means must be found to eliminate burdens of compliance
on sellers making only small amounts of sales in a state. These might
include software-based systems made available at state expense, more
79. The author presented this appeal to the ACEC during his invited statement before
the Commission on December 15, 1999. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce:
Third Meeting, supra note 56, at 59-69. At that time there were forty-nine signatories.
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realistic vendor discounts, and/or de minimis rules.
[This statement does not represent the position of the institu-
tions with which the signatories are associated.]
Name Affiliation
Henry Aaron Brookings Institution; Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare,
1977-78
James Alm Georgia State University
Rosanne Altshuler Rutgers University
John E. Anderson University of Nebraska
Ashish Arora Carnegie Mellon University
Alan Auerbach University of California, Berkeley; Deputy
Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1992
Hugh J. Ault Boston College Law School
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Harvard Law School
Dave Babbel Wharton School; University of Pennsyl-
vania
Roy Bahl Georgia State University
Charles L. Ballard Michigan State University
Marion S. Beaumont California State University, Long Beach
Robert Berne New York University
B. Douglas Bernheim Stanford University
Marsha Blumenthal University of St. Thomas
William T. Bogart Case Western Reserve University
John H. Bowman Virginia Commonwealth University
David F. Bradford Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Uni-
versity, and New York University School
of Law; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Analysis, 1975-1976;
Member of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers, 1991-93
George F. Break University of California, Berkeley
(emeritus)
David A. Brennen University of Richmond Law School
Evelyn Brody Chicago-Kent College of Law
Jeffrey R. Brown Harvard, Kennedy School of Government
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Lawrence R. Brown Lewis & Clark College, School of Law
Neil Bruce University of Washington
Paul L. Caron University of Cincinnati College of Law
Karl E. Case Wellesley College
Howard Chernick Hunter College, City University of New
York
Robert Chirinko Emory University
Charles Clotfelter Duke University
Julie H. Collins University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill
Joseph J. Cordes George Washington University
Gary Cornia Brigham Young University
Paul Courant University of Michigan
Steven G. Craig University of Houston
Julie Berry Cullen University of Michigan
Martin David University of Wisconsin
Charles de Bartolome University of Colorado at Boulder
Larry DeBoer Purdue University
Peter Diamond Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Joseph Dodge University of Texas Law School
Thomas Downes Tufts University
John F. Due University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign, emeritus
William Dumcombe Syracuse University
Amy Dunbar University of Connecticut
Richard Dye Lake Forest College
Robert Ebel World Bank
Kelly D. Edmiston Georgia State University
Daniel Feenberg National Bureau of Economic Research
Alan L. Feld Boston University
Glenn W. Fisher Wichita State University (emeritus)
Ronald Fisher Michigan State University
William F. Fox University of Tennessee
Martin L. Fried Syracuse University College of Law
Don Fullerton University of Texas; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis,
1985-87
William Gale Brookings Institution
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Greg Geisler Georgia State University
William M. Gentry Columbia University
Wendy Gerzog University of Baltimore School of Law
J. Fred Giertz University of Illinois at Urbana Cham-
paign
Malcolm Gillis President, Rice University
Tim Goodspeed Hunter College, City University of New
York
Austan Goolsbee University of Chicago
Roger H. Gordon University of Michigan
Larry Goulder Stanford University
Michael Graetz Yale Law School; Deputy Asst. Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy, 1990-92
Kenneth V. Greene State University of New York,
Binghamton
Jonathan Gruber Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sanjay Gupta Arizona State University
Daniel Halperin Harvard Law School; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
1978-81
Arnold C. Harberger University of California, Los Angeles
Joseph E. Harington, Jr. The Johns Hopkins University
C. Lowell Harriss Columbia University (emeritus)
Robert Haveman University of Wisconsin, Madison
Richard Hawkins University of West Florida
Walter Hellerstein University of Georgia Law School
W. Bartley Hildreth Wichita State University
Douglas Holtz-Eakin Syracuse University
Scott Houser California State University, Fresno
Glenn Hubbard Columbia University; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis,
1991-93
David Hudson University of Florida College of Law
Gary Hufbauer International Institute of Economics;
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Trade and Investment Policy,
1977-80
John M. Huie Purdue University
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
120
Robert P. Inman Wharton School, University of Pennsyl-
vania
Calvin Johnson University of Texas Law School
William R. Johnson University of Virginia
Kenneth Judd Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Richard L. Kaplan University of Illinois College of Law
Daphne A. Kenyon Simmons College
Marjorie E. Kornhauser Tulane Law School
Laurence Kotlikoff Boston University
Helen F. Ladd Duke University
Michael B. Lang University of Southern Maine
Henry J. Lischer, Jr. Southern Methodist University Law
School
Jane H. Leuthold University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign
Arik Levinson University of Wisconsin, Madison
Andrew B. Lyon University of Maryland
Louis J. Maccini The Johns Hopkins University
Brigitte Madrian University of Chicago
Jorge Martinez Georgia State University
Michael J. McIntyre Wayne State University Law School
Charles McLure Hoover Institution, Stanford University;
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Tax Analysis, 1983-85
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. University of Florida College of Law
Gilber E. Metcalf Tufts University
Bruce D. Meyer Northwestern University
Peter Mieszkowski Rice University
John L. Mikesell Indiana University-Bloomington
Lilian F. Mills University of Arizona
Robert A. Moffitt The Johns Hopkins University
George Mundstock University of Miami Law School
Alicia H. Munnell Boston College; Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Economic Policy, 1993-95;
Member of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers, 95-97
Matthew N. Murray University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Peggy Musgrave University of California-Santa Cruz
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
077] Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?
121
Richard A. Musgrave Harvard University (emeritus)
Dick Netzer New York University
Sarah E. Nutter George Mason University
William Oakland Tulane University
Wallace Oates University of Maryland
Oliver Oldman Harvard Law School
Edgar O. Olsen University of Virginia
Jon M. Peha Carnegie Mellon University
James A. Papke Purdue University
Ronald A. Pearlman Georgetown University Law Center;
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
1983-84; Assistant Secretary for Tax Pol-
icy, 1984-85; Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 1988-90
Robert J. Peroni George Washington University Law
School
George A. Plesko Sloan School of Management, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology
Thomas F. Pogue University of Iowa
Clarissa Potter Georgetown University Law Center
Elizabeth Powers University of Illinois
Antonio Rangel Stanford University
Andrew Reschovsky University of Wisconsin-Madison
James A. Richardson Louisiana State University
Raymond J. Ring, Jr. University of South Dakota
Mildred W. Robinson University of Virginia School of Law
Diane Lim Rogers Urban Institute
Paul Romer Stanford University
Michael Rothschild Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Uni-
versity
Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California, Berkeley
Allan Samansky Ohio State University College of Law
Andrew A. Samwick Dartmouth College
Ferdinand P. Schoettle University of Minnesota Law School
John Karl Scholz University of Wisconsin, Madison; Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Analysis, 1997-98
Robert M. Schwab University of Maryland
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
122
Amy Ellen Schwartz New York University
W. Eugene Seago Virginia Tech
Bruce A. Seaman Georgia State University
Laurence Seidman University of Delaware
Douglas Shackelford University of North Carolina
Daniel N. Shaviro NYU Law School
Steve Sheffrin University of California, Davis
Reed Shuldiner University of Pennsylvania Law School
Todd Sinai The Wharton School, University of Penn-
sylvania
David Sjoquist Georgia State University
Jonathan Skinner Dartmouth College
Paul Smoke Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jon Sonstelle University of California, Santa Barbara
Janet F. Speyrer University of New Orleans
Eugene Steuerle Urban Institute; Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis,
1987-89
Leanna Stiefel New York University
Robert Strauss Carnegie-Mellon University
Corrine Taylor Wellesley College
Eric Toder Urban Institute; Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis,
1993-96
William J. Turnier University of North Carolina School of
Law
Holley Ulbrich Clemson University
Stephen Vasek University of Kentucky, College of Law
Sally Wallace Georgia State University
Lawrence Walters Brigham Young University
Rob Wassmer California State University, Sacramento
Michael Wasylenko Syracuse University
David A. Weisbach University of Chicago Law School
Ann Dryden Witte Wellesley College
John Witte University of Wisconsin, Madison
Bernard Wolfman Harvard Law School
George K. Yin University of Virginia
George Zodrow Rice University
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
077] Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?
123
C. Kurt Zorn Indiana University-Bloomington
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000
124
APPENDIX C
Radical Simplification of State Sales and Use Taxes:
The Prerequisite for an Expanded Duty to Collect
Use Tax on Remote Sales
A PROPOSAL TO THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 80
Preface
The existing state sales and use taxes are a product of their
time—a time when local merchants sold primarily tangible products
almost exclusively to local customers. They are not suited to the
twenty-first century, when services and intangible products will be
much more important than tangible products and remote sales of
tangible products and digitized content, especially via electronic com-
merce, will be increasingly important. The most obvious problem is
complexity:
•Each of forty-six states (including DC) chooses its own tax
base, with no requirement that the base—or even what might be
in the base—be uniform across the nation.
•Each state decides what should be exempt when bought by
business.
•Each state sets its own administrative requirements and proce-
dures, including registration, filing of tax returns, payment,
audit, and appeals.
•Roughly 7,000 local jurisdictions also levy sales and use taxes.
•Most local jurisdictions levying sales taxes choose their own
tax rates.
•Local jurisdictions in some states do not follow the state
definition of the tax base.
80. Footnotes 82 to 88 have been added; they do not appear in the proposal to the
ACEC.
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•Boundaries of local jurisdictions do not correspond to
postal ZIP codes.
•Local governments change their tax rates from time-to-
time, making it difficult for taxpayers81 to know the current
rate.
Because of this complexity, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1967
(National Bellas Hess82) and again in 1992 (Quill83), ruled that a re-
mote vendor could not be required to collect use tax on sales to
customers in a state where it lacks a physical presence (nexus). The
result is loss of state and local tax revenue, unfair competition for
Main Street merchants, and discrimination against those who pa-
tronize those merchants, instead of remote vendors—problems that
the growth of electronic commerce will aggravate. Sound public
policy demands that remote vendors, including those engaged in
electronic commerce, collect use tax on their sales, if those sales ex-
ceed a de minimis amount. As Ronald Reagan said in 1981, “The
taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for
legitimate government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the
economy or bring about social change.”84 But an expanded duty to
collect makes sense only if there is radical simplification of the state
sales and use tax “system.” This proposal describes a system that
would meet this objective and (in the Annex) indicates how the pro-
posed system meets the criteria proposed by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Electronic Commerce (ACEC).85 The proposal is intended
to be revenue neutral in each state and locality; tax rates would be
raised or lowered, as required to maintain revenues, but not increase
revenues.
81. The term “taxpayer” is used (somewhat inaccurately) for both vendors who are le-
gally liable for sales taxes and vendors who (actually or potentially) collect use taxes that legally
are due from their customers.
82. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
83. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
84. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS.
131, 137 (Feb. 18, 1981).
85. The annex containing the required certification that the proposal satisfies the criteria
announced by the ACEC is omitted.
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THE PROPOSAL: SUMMARY STATEMENT
This section summarizes the proposals, which are described in
detail and justified in the next section.
1. There would be a single uniform nation-wide base for sales
and use tax.
a. The base would consist of all consumption spending by
households.
•Tangible products, services, and intangibles would have
the same tax.
•Local merchants and remote vendors would collect the
same tax.
b. All business purchases would be exempt in all states.
•There would be a nationally uniform exemption certifi-
cate.
2. Compliance would be simplified and made less costly for ven-
dors (two options):
a. Forms and payments would be filed with one state (base-
state approach).
•De minimis rule would eliminate the duty of some to
collect use tax.
•Realistic vendors’ discounts would facilitate “zero-cost”
compliance.
b. Trusted third parties (TTPs) would calculate/remit tax
(TTP approach).
•Taxpayers would be subject to joint audits on behalf of
all states.
3. Software would be used to determine the situs of sales and
state and local tax rates.
a. States would certify software and provide it without
charge to vendors or TTPs.
b.  A “hold-harmless” clause would protect vendors who rely
on the software.
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In addition to these “primary proposals” there are several “fall-
back positions” that some may find more politically realistic. The
primary proposals provide a benchmark against which to judge other
proposals the ACEC may receive, as well as the fallback positions.
Because the proposed system is vastly simpler than conceptually de-
fensible alternatives, the need for simplification may drive decision-
makers toward it, despite the conventional wisdom that it is politi-
cally unrealistic.
THE PROPOSALS:
DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
The Tax Base: General
Proposal A. All states would define the tax base identically. All
sales to households in a state would be subject to tax, whether sold
by local merchants or remote vendors, unless there were agreement
among all states to exempt certain items (e.g., prescription drugs).
Services and intangible products would be subject to tax, when
bought by households. Special taxes on telecommunications would
be eliminated.
Rationale. The tax base would be defined uniformly in all states to
simplify compliance and administration. Remote vendors would need
to deal with only one definition of the tax base, instead of forty-six
(or more, considering local taxes). All sales to households would be
taxed to prevent erosion of the tax base, simplify the system (e.g., no
need to distinguish taxable and exempt food or clothing), avoid
distortion of consumer choices, and treat those who buy from local
merchants like those who buy from remote vendors. The enormous
difficulty in gaining agreement on what should be in the uniform tax
base suggests acceptance of the conceptually correct solution: taxing
all consumption spending. Worth special note is the avoidance of
“indistinct distinctions,” such as those between certain tangible
products (e.g., shrink-wrapped software, music CDs, and video cas-
settes) and virtually identical intangible products (software, music,
and videos) downloaded from the Internet. Such distinctions com-
plicate compliance and administration and have no economic justifi-
cation. Including services and intangible products in the tax base
would allow reduction of tax rates. There is no justification for spe-
cial taxes on telecommunications.
Discussion. Problems with the proposal are primarily political. In
addition to the loss of state fiscal sovereignty implied by a uniform
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tax base, there would be serious opposition to taxation of services
and intangible products, even in a revenue-neutral context.
Fallback A1. States might be allowed to choose their own tax
bases, but be required to define what is or is not subject to tax iden-
tically. (Conceptually there would be a “menu” of commonly de-
fined products, beside which each state writes “taxable” or “ex-
empt.”) Computerized “look-up tables” would indicate whether
each product is taxed in each state. Bar codes could indicate the
product category into which most tangible products fall. To be prac-
tical, there should be only a few well-defined product categories—
perhaps no more than a dozen. Local jurisdictions should not be al-
lowed to deviate from the state tax base.
Rationale. The primary proposal involves a radical departure
from present practice, in which states choose their own tax bases.
The fallback combines greater uniformity than current law with
greater state fiscal sovereignty than the primary proposal.
Discussion. A menu of potentially taxed products might contain
about 10,000 products—more or fewer, depending on the degree of
aggregation of products. Look-up tables with 460,000 cells (one for
each of 10,000 items in forty-six states) are conceptually feasible, but
perhaps impractical; they would certainly be impractical for catalog
sales if the purchaser desires to know the tax due when placing an
order. Unless categories were chosen extremely carefully, “indistinct
distinctions” and attendant problems would remain.
Fallback A2. It may be politically expedient to provide an ex-
emption for Internet access purchased by households. (Purchases of
Internet access by businesses would be exempt under the conceptu-
ally correct tax treatment of business purchases, considered below.)
Discussion. There is little justification for exempting Internet ac-
cess by households. An exemption would complicate compliance and
administration, because Internet access is commonly bundled with
other (presumably taxable) products, and would have adverse dis-
tributional implications.
The Tax Base: Exemption of Business Purchases
Proposal B. The conceptually correct way to treat business pur-
chases is for all states to treat them identically by exempting them.
(Exemption achieves the same result as under the value added taxes
used in the European Union, where businesses receive a credit for
tax paid on purchases.) A uniform exemption certificate should be
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used throughout the nation.86
Rationale. Uniform treatment of business purchases would simplify
compliance and administration; remote sellers would need to know
only one set of rules, not forty-six. (The “uniform” exemption cer-
tificate drafted by the Multistate Tax Commission is not uniform,
because state laws are not uniform.) Sellers would not need to judge
the eligibility of their customers to make tax-free purchases, de-
pending on the use of the product, as now. Exemption of business
purchases would eliminate defects of the present system: discrimina-
tion among products, distortion of production decisions, incentives
for vertical integration, and a tax cost that cannot be recovered on
exports. While exemptions for business purchases (initially available
only for resale) have been expanded over time, they remain far from
comprehensive. Thus the purchases of some sectors are taxed, while
those of others are exempt. The proposal would eliminate all such
discrimination.
Discussion. Problems with the proposal are primarily political. In
addition to the loss of state fiscal sovereignty, elimination of all busi-
ness purchases from the tax base would necessitate increasing tax
rates to maintain revenue in a revenue-neutral context.87
Fallback B. States could continue to decide whether or not to
exempt various types of business purchases, but be required to define
the various types of business purchases that might be exempt identi-
cally. (Conceptually there would be a menu of commonly defined
types of business purchases, beside which each state writes “taxable”
or “exempt.”) Computerized “look-up tables” would indicate tax
treatment in each state. To be practical, there should be only a few
well-defined categories—perhaps no more than a half-dozen. Use of
“direct pay” by business customers should be expanded.
Rationale/discussion. This alternative achieves much—but not
all—of the simplification of the conceptually ideal proposal, without
as much loss of state sovereignty or reduction of tax bases. The ad-
86. Eligibility for exemption of business purchases could be based on federal income tax
law: a purchase would be exempt from sales and use tax if (and only if) it qualifies for a federal
income tax deduction (or depreciation allowance, etc.). Since this eligibility is all that need be
addressed in a uniform exemption certificate, eligibility could be certified simply by checking a
box on a paper order form or clicking on a box in the order form on a website and providing
the purchaser’s employer identification number.
87. If that were the only change, average rates would rise substantially. Taxing services
would create an offsetting tendency for rates to fall.
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verse economic effects of the present system would remain, but each
state would have the option of exempting all categories of business
purchases to attract business. Direct pay, which would not be needed
under the primary proposal, would reduce the need for vendors to
determine whether sales to businesses are for exempt uses.
Sourcing/Situsing of Sales and Local Tax Rates
The situs of remote sales determines the local tax rate to be ap-
plied and the jurisdiction that receives tax revenue from a sale. It is
thus convenient to consider local tax rates together with the situs of
remote sales.
Prefatory discussion. State sales taxes are based on the destina-
tion of sales—or would be, if remote sales were taxed and business
inputs were exempt. Unlike origin-based taxation, destination-based
taxation avoids distortion of the location of economic activity.
Moreover, private consumption is generally a reasonable proxy for
the consumption of public services. The conceptually correct way to
determine the situs of remote sales is thus to attribute them to the
state and locality of destination of the sale.
Proposal C. Software would be used (a) to determine the state
and local tax rates that should be applied to remote sales of particular
products and (b) to prepare the reports containing the information
needed by states to channel revenues to the appropriate local juris-
dictions. Such software would contain rules—to be applied uniformly
across the nation—needed to determine the situs of sales not in-
volving tangible products (e.g., for services and telecommunica-
tions).
Discussion. The proposal implements destination-based taxation
and provides local governments with autonomy over the tax rate,
which would be applied to both sales by local merchants and remote
sales. Several qualifications are appropriate. First, states should certify
software and enact “hold harmless” rules to protect remote vendors
from relatively minor and unintentional errors resulting from good-
faith reliance on such software, including those that result from the
software vendor’s failure to update rate tables. (Local governments
should bear the burden of informing providers of software of
changes in rates.) Second, such software can be used only for sales to
customers that are willing to allow the vendor to calculate the tax
and add it to the bill. A special regime may be needed for those who
remit by check or money order when placing an order. It might be
based on the “one-rate-per-state” fallback position discussed below.
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Fallback C. Business representatives argue that remote sales
should be attributed (“sourced”) only to the state level, claiming
that it is impossible to determine accurately the local situs of remote
sales. Local governments could set sales tax rates, but there would be
only one use tax rate per state, and states would be responsible for
allocating revenue from use tax among their local jurisdictions.
Discussion. The fallback would retain local autonomy over local
sales tax rates, but eliminate autonomy over local use tax rates. Local
jurisdictions would receive revenues from taxes on sales by local mer-
chants, but depend on sharing of revenues from the statewide local
use tax. This arrangement would allow local jurisdictions to meet
their obligations under debt covenants that dedicate revenues from
local sales tax to debt service. Local governments imposing sales tax
rates well below the statewide local use tax rate might compensate
local residents for excess use tax on remote purchases. Where local
sales tax rates exceed the statewide use tax rate, discrimination
against local merchants would remain.
Unallocable Sales
Proposal D. Remote sales that cannot be allocated to a state
(because remote vendors do not know the location of a buyer of
digitized content) and remote sales that fall below the de minimis
threshold (see below) would be subject to a national “substitute” use
tax, revenues from which would be shared among the states, perhaps
on the basis of estimated consumer spending in the state.88
Rationale/discussion. It is not satisfactory to attribute unallocable
sales to the state of origin of remote commerce; doing so creates an
incentive to locate operations in states with no sales tax. Billing ad-
dresses can be used to determine the location of some customers,
but not all. The need for the national substitute use tax is one ad-
vantage of having a nationally uniform state sales tax base, which
would be used as the base of that tax. States that have no sales tax
(or rates well below the national tax) could refund the national tax
(or the difference in rates) to their residents. Technological devel-
opments may make this provision unnecessary.
88. The substitute use tax would be implemented by the states, not the federal govern-
ment. In the text I have substituted “among” for “with,” which might give the impression that
the substitute use tax would be imposed by the federal government.
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Administrative Aspects
Administration of state sales and use taxes should be simpler and
more uniform throughout the nation. Two options deserve atten-
tion.
Proposal E1: the Base State Approach. Taxpayers would col-
lect use tax in all states where sales exceed de minimis amounts. But
they would file a single form to register in all states and another to
pay tax due in all states. Forms might be filed in the state in which
the firm has its commercial domicile (the “base state”) or with a
multistate agency. The base state or multistate agency would forward
revenues to states where sales occur, which would divide revenues
among local jurisdictions, on the basis of information provided by
taxpayers. There would be joint audits on behalf of all states and a
common appeals process.
Discussion. Tax authorities in each state would need to know the
tax laws of all other states. This system would thus work best if there
were a common definition of the tax base. It would not work in the
absence of a common menu of potentially taxable products.
Proposal E2: Use of Trusted Third Parties. This approach
would shift compliance from the vendor to a trusted third party
(TTP). The TTP would calculate tax and remit it to states where
sales are made, with an indication of the division of revenues among
local jurisdictions.
Discussion. Further analysis is needed to determine whether the
base-state approach or the TTP approach is more promising.
Zero-cost Compliance
Proposal F. Implementation of a destination-based sales tax re-
quires remote vendors or TTPs to use sophisticated and expensive
software. State governments should provide the software at no cost.
(There is precedent. When Canada introduced the VAT, it subsi-
dized purchase of new cash registers.) Under the base-state approach
vendors’ discounts should be set to defray costs of compliance.
(They might not be needed under the TTPs approach.) These costs
can be quite high, as a percentage of revenues, for small vendors.
De Minimis Rule
Proposal G. It may be desirable to have a de minimis rule; ven-
dors with total remote sales below a certain level would be relieved
of the need to participate in the base-state system or utilize a TTP.
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Discussion. From an economic point of view, making sales in a
state, rather than physical presence, should be the test of nexus. Yet,
it may be unreasonable or uneconomical to require firms with small
remote sales to participate in the regular system. (There might be
relatively little need for a de minimis rule if all the primary proposals
made here were adopted.)
Concluding Remarks
Because the proposals made here form a package, comments on
the entire package are appropriate.
The Integrity of the Proposals
Taken together the primary proposals would radically simplify
state sales and use taxes and make it reasonable to impose an ex-
panded duty to collect use tax. If proposed changes are omitted or
replaced by the fallback positions, there would be substantially less
simplification—so much less that an expanded duty to collect might
become questionable.
If there were a menu of taxable products, instead of a uniform
and comprehensive base, the software needed to implement use taxes
would be more complicated and expensive, classification of products
would be more controversial and onerous, state certification of soft-
ware and a “hold-harmless” provision would be problematical, the
base-state approach and use of TTPs might be infeasible, and the de
minimis threshold would need to be higher. The severity of prob-
lems would depend on the level of aggregation of the menu. More-
over, it is unlikely that technological neutrality would be maintained
in constructing the menu. If there were not even a uniform menu
from which states would choose their tax base, it seems unlikely that
enough simplification could be achieved to justify an expanded duty
to collect.
The Question of State Sovereignty and Local Autonomy
Some will attack some of these proposals (e.g., the proposal for a
uniform tax base) as an unwelcome intrusion on state fiscal sover-
eignty. That view loses sight of the larger picture. The state sover-
eignty that was possible when local merchants sold primarily tangible
products almost exclusively to local customers is no longer possible,
or at least not a realistic alternative, as it implies enormous complex-
ity for remote vendors and thus the legal inability to tax remote sales,
including those in electronic commerce. The proposals represent an
attempt to craft a compromise between the need for revenue and the
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power to set state tax rates—arguably higher orders of state sover-
eignty—and control over the tax base, arguably a less important as-
pect of sovereignty. They also attempt to retain local autonomy over
local sales and use tax rates.
The Need for Federal Legislation
In theory, it might be possible for the states to act cooperatively
to implement a system such as that proposed here, without federal
legislation. If they did, the Supreme Court might eliminate the
physical presence test of nexus. In fact, history does not inspire con-
fidence that the states would act in this way, and the Court might
not respond as predicted, even if they did. In any event, there would
be unacceptable uncertainty. Thus, it seems almost certain that fed-
eral legislation would be required to implement the proposals made
here. Rather than requiring that states adopt the proposals (the
“stick” approach), legislation could allow an expanded duty to col-
lect only for states that adopt the proposals (the “carrot” approach).
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APPENDIX D
Implementing a State VAT
The following is brief description of the mechanics of one way to
implement a state VAT.
1. The basic mechanics of the VAT89
Under the standard VAT of the type used in the European Un-
ion (and virtually everywhere else) tax is collected on all sales,
whether made to businesses or to households. Business taxpayers are
allowed to offset (credit) tax paid on their purchases against tax due
on sales.90 The only tax that is not offset is that on sales to house-
holds. Thus, the credit for tax paid on business purchases achieves
exactly the same purpose as the exemption of sales to business under
the conceptually pure RST.91
2. VAT on interstate trade92
Under the destination principle, VAT is collected on imports and
rebated on exports, so that the effect is the same as under the ideal
RST, which also applies to imports, but not to exports. The VAT
treatment of exports is called “zero-rating.” A rate of zero is applied
to exports, credit is allowed for any VAT exporters have paid on their
purchase, and excess credits are refunded, so that exports occur tax-
free.
VAT on international imports is ordinarily collected at the bor-
der. Within the European Union (EU) business imports are not
taxed at the border; since credit will be allowed for tax paid by busi-
ness, there is no need to collect tax at the border. This tax treatment
is called “deferred payment,” since tax on imports is deferred until
products produced using the imports are sold.
It has long been thought that a subnational VAT is too compli-
cated to be feasible. It now appears, however, that this is not the
89. See MCLURE, supra note 31. To simplify exposition, I do not consider exemptions
or sales to or by non-profit organizations, governments, or quasi-governmental agencies and
lump unregistered traders together with households.
90. In this simple description I lump registered traders together with households.
91. The coverage of sales to households under the VAT is also much more comprehen-
sive than that of the typical RST. This is not inherently the case. But, as noted in Section
III.B.2, the functioning of the VAT creates political forces that encourage taxation of most
goods and services that might also be sold to businesses.
92. See McClure, CVAT, supra note 65; see also McClure, Breaking the Logjam, supra
note 65. Those papers do not consider the local VATs.
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case—that a state VAT may be feasible. The issue involves the tax
treatment of interstate trade: how can a destination-based tax be im-
posed, without border controls between states (thought to be
needed to implement the refund of taxes imposed in the exporting
state and collection of taxes of the importing state) or complicated
clearinghouse arrangements (needed to channel revenues collected
by origin states to states of destination)? If zero-rating and deferred
payment is employed on interstate sales, how can households be pre-
vented from masquerading as business purchasers? This issue contin-
ues to vex the EU.93
Quebec has shown that a subnational tax is feasible in the con-
text of a system of dual national/subnational VATs.94 The need to
comply with the Canadian federal VAT prevents abuse of the system
of zero-rating/deferred payment employed by the province. But
what if there is no federal VAT, as in the United States?
It appears that the use of a uniform “compensating VAT”
(CVAT), to be imposed jointly at a uniform rate by the states on all
interstate exports and allowed as a credit by business purchasers of
interstate exports, combined with zero-rating/deferred payment un-
der the ordinary state VAT, allows a relatively satisfactory resolution
of the problem at the state level. Tax on business purchases (whether
the ordinary VAT or the CVAT) is eliminated by tax credits. Sales to
households that pass through a retail outlet in the destination state
are subject to the VAT of that state. By comparison, remote sales to
households are subject only to the CVAT, instead of the state VAT,
with CVAT revenues from such sales being distributed among the
states by formula. (There is no net revenue from CVAT on sales to
business.) In other words, there is nothing analogous to the state use
tax. Nor can there be local surcharges, even for sales made by Main
Street merchants.
I originally advocated the CVAT system as a means of allowing
subnational governments in less developed countries (LDCs) and
93. For an alternative to the system described below, see Michael Keen & Stephen
Smith, The Future of the Value Added Tax in the European Union, 23 ECON. POL’Y 375, 375-
411, 419-20 (1996). Space does not allow a full discussion of the relative merits of the two
systems. See, however, Michael Keen, CVAT, VIVAT, and All That: New Forms of Value-
Added Tax for Federal Systems (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); See also
McLure, CVAT, supra note 65.
94. See Richard M. Bird & Pierre Pascal Gendron, Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade:
Two Problems, One Solution?, 5 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 429 (1998).
MCL-FIN.DOC 03/18/00  11:56 AM
077] Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?
137
countries in transition from socialism (CITs) to have access to reve-
nues from a sales tax. The subnational VAT (with CVAT) would
work better than the subnational RST in that context, since most
national governments in LDCs and CITs already impose VAT and it
would be a mistake to suggest a combination of national VAT and
subnational RST. Moreover, in LDCs and CITs the issue of local
sales taxes arises relatively rarely. Of course, in the United States
there is no federal sales tax, but there are local sales taxes. In that
context it seems more sensible to reform the state and local RST
along the lines proposed than to make the radical switch to a state
VAT, which apparently can accommodate neither state use taxes nor
local sales (and use) taxes.
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